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Stephen H. Greetham* 
WATER PLANNING, TRIBAL VOICES, AND 
CREATIVE APPROACHES: SEEKING NEW PATHS 
THROUGH TRIBAL-STATE WATER CONFLICT 
BY COLLABORATION ON STATE WATER 
PLANNING EFFORTS 
ABSTRACT 
More than a century after the Supreme Court issued its 
foundational Indian water law cases, only a handful of American 
Indian tribes have secured decrees or settlements of legally 
enforceable water rights. Efforts to resolve tribal water claims 
are typically hampered by legal and factual complexities as well 
as the equitable and political legacy of the United States’ western 
expansion. Meanwhile, those difficulties notwithstanding, 
planners are refining their methodologies and rising to new 
challenges our water resource management systems now face 
(e.g., climate variability, aging infrastructure, changing use-
value priorities, etc.). Signaling a departure from exclusive 
reliance on formal dispute resolution mechanisms for facilitating 
tribal-state engagement on water resource issues, states have 
begun to engage tribal governments in collaborative water 
planning efforts. While planning cannot serve as a substitute for 
the enforceable legal finality of a decree or congressionally 
approved settlement, tribal-state collaboration in appropriate 
context and structure may present new opportunities for making 
overdue progress. Drawing on law, history, political science, 
Native American studies, and principals of dispute resolution and 
management, this article situates and explores the experiences of 
California, New Mexico, and Oklahoma in their outreach to 
tribes in state-led water planning efforts. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Early twentieth century water planning facilitated development of massive 
infrastructure and made widespread western settlement and economic development 
 
* Stephen Greetham serves as Senior Counsel and Special Counsel, Water and Natural Resources, 
to the Chickasaw Nation and as Adjunct Professor of Law for the University of Oklahoma College of 
Law. As an attorney, he has represented Taos Pueblo and the Chickasaw Nation in securing negotiated 
settlements of their water claims. He offers his heartfelt and everlasting gratitude to Amanda Cobb-
Greetham—his wife, partner, sounding board, and invaluable collaborator in all things. 
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possible.1 While they do not create law, these plans and the projects they produced 
gave shape to the physical, economic, and policy context in which the law has long 
been applied. Largely coinciding with federal assimilationist and terminationist 
policies2 though, the government developed its plans without tribal input and with 
little concern for the adverse impact its projects would have on tribal lands, 
resources, and collective legal rights. This boundary limitation imposed on first 
generation water plans—the exclusion of tribal voices and failure to integrate 
identifiable tribal interests—has thus contributed to generations of complex and 
confounding water resource conflicts, which regularly sharpen tribal-state conflict 
lines. 
Today, rising to a new era of challenges, water planners are refining their 
art and bending themselves to the task of developing new strategies, institutions, 
and funding priorities to address this century’s resource management challenges.3 
Like the earlier plans, today’s will not decide legal rights; nonetheless, they will 
establish frameworks and relationships that will shape how we move forward with 
our inherited conflicts. I have previously suggested that adapting water planning 
boundary conditions to better integrate tribal voices—an approach that would seem 
more in keeping with modern policies that support tribal self-determination and 
government-to-government engagement4—may provide opportunities for 
productive intergovernmental collaboration.5 This article further explores the 
concept. 
 
 1. E.g., John R. Mather, WATER RESOURCES: DISTRIBUTION, USE, AND MANAGEMENT 294, 296- 
301 (1984); W. Eugene Hollon, THE GREAT AMERICAN DESERT, THEN AND NOW 160,161-74 (1966). 
 2. E.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 1.04-1.06, at 71-93 (Nell Jessup 
Newtoned., 2012) (hereinafter, “COHEN’S”). 
 3. See, Water Resources Planning Act, Pub. L. 89-80, § 2, 79 Stat. 244 (1965) (declaring national 
policy of encouraging “the conservation, development, and utilization of water and related land 
resources . . . on a comprehensive and coordinated basis”); National Water Commission Act, Pub. L. 90-
515, § 3(a), 82 Stat. 868 (1968) (directing newly established commission to evaluate “national water 
resource problems” and, in doing so, “consider economic and social consequences of water resource 
development”); Cal. Water Code § 10004(a) (West 2001) (directing plan “for the orderly and 
coordinated control, protection, conservation, development, and utilization of the water resources of the 
state”); NMSA 1978, § 72-14-3.1 (2003) (directing “comprehensive state water plan” to serve as 
“strategic management tool” for enumerated objectives); Okla. Stat.tit. 82 § 1086.1 (1992) (directing 
plan “for the management, protection, conservation, structural and nonstructural development and 
utilization of water resources,” with particular emphasis on “excess and surplus waters,” and 
enumerating specific considerations); See also, James P. Morris, Who Controls the Waters? 
Incorporating Environmental and Social Values in Water Resource Planning, 6 Hastings W.-N.W. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 117, 118-19, 120-29 (2000) (discussing history and 
evolution of modern water planning); Cf., Kathleen A. Miller, Grappling with Uncertainty: Water 
Planning and Policy in a Changing Climate, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 395, 395- 
96, 406-07 (2010) (discussing methods for adapting water planning to the uncertainties presented by 
climate change). 
 4. E.g., COHEN’S, supra note 2, § 1.07 at 93-108. 
 5. See, Stephen H. Greetham, Water Planning: An Opportunity for Managing Uncertainties at the 
Tribal-State Interface?, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 593, 594, 604-13 (2012). Accord, Curtis Berkey, Tribal 
Participation in California Water Planning 1-5 (November 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.berkeywilliams.com/docs/Briefing_Paper_2009_Tribal_Water_Summit.pdf. 
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Of course, fostering collaboration among heterogeneous interests is a 
challenge,6 particularly when polarizing legal disputes remain outstanding. All the 
same, while natural resource fights do not intuitively foster partnerships, 
cooperative engagement in this area does occur, even across cultural, legal, and 
political lines7, and such occurrences–whether they succeed or fail prompt useful 
questions starting with: What can we learn from those experiences? What do they 
teach about the hurdles inherent to the tribal-state dynamic? What do they teach 
about how competing sovereignty and proprietary concerns might be handled (or at 
least not harmed) by supplemental approaches potentially capable of securing 
additional social goods? And more to the point: Are there not other, perhaps 
supplemental, mechanisms we can rely on in our efforts to reach workable 
resolutions of longstanding conflict? 
Discussions of tribal water tend to focus on conflict and injustice. As 
political scientist Burton wryly notes: 
There is a vast literature bemoaning the immoral treatment of 
indigenous Americans, in part because there is no shortage of 
examples of such treatment. Less common is some consideration 
of how we might go about righting old wrongs (restoring tribal 
water supplies) without committing news ones (taking water 
from non-Indians who thought they had acquired good title to it 
under state law).8 
The point of this article, however, is not to add to the literature “bemoaning” the 
treatment of American Indian tribes. It is instead intended to lay out a sober 
overview of relevant dynamics for purposes of examining a potential mechanism 
for increasing the likelihood of improving tribal-state efforts in a manner that 
affirms American Indian rights and sovereignty without undue disruption to the 
complex of equities and otherwise lawful rights vested during the past centuries of 
tribal dispossession. Efforts to achieve fair and workable resolutions of reserved 
tribal rights must continue, and in those efforts, there is no substitute for the 
enforceable finality only legal proceedings can provide; all the same, water 
planning may offer useful tools for improving our approaches to tribal-state water 
conflict in those instances where enforceable finality has not yet been achieved. For 
such potential to be realized, planners must break from the boundary conditions of 
prior generations and actively seek the integration of tribal voices into the 
collaborative fact finding and assessment, issue spotting, and strategic policy 
formation processes that make up modern water planning. 
With this potential in mind, this article evaluates the context and 
experience of tribal-state engagement in water planning, focusing specifically on 
 
 6. Edella Schlager and William Blomquist, Resolving Common Pool Resource Dilemmas and 
Heterogenities Among Resource Users 1 (June 10-14, 1998) (unpublished conference paper), 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/1009/schlager.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 7. E.g., Zoltán Grossman, Unlikely Alliances: Treaty Conflicts and Environmental Cooperation 
between Native American and Rural White Communities, AM. IND. CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 29.4 at 
21-43 (2005). Professor Grossman’s article has been expanded to his recent book: Unlikely Alliances: 
Native Nations and White Communities Join to Defend Rural Lands (2017).  
 8. Lloyd Burton, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW x (1991). 
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state outreach to, and integration of, tribal government participation in state water 
planning efforts. As foundation for the discussion, Part II situates recurrent and 
archetypal tribal-state water conflict interests—interests that go beyond the water 
resources themselves—within the relevant legal and historical setting and offers a 
brief assessment of how traditional adversarial modes of conflict resolution, i.e., 
litigation and formal negotiation, have fared in reconciling those interests. Part III 
examines water planning as an evolving tool for approaching complex common 
pool resource challenges and reviews specific state efforts (by California, New 
Mexico, and Oklahoma) to integrate tribes into their planning processes, and 
evaluates those efforts to discern broader lessons before offering broader 
observations. Part IV offers a conclusion, lessons learned, and questions for us to 
answer moving forward. 
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES: 
CONTEXT, INTERESTS, AND HOW WE HAVE FARED SO FAR 
A. The Origin, Context, and Contours of Western Water Conflict 
From the Louisiana Purchase9 to the Gadsden Purchase,10 the United 
States took a mere fifty years to stretch from the Mississippi to the Pacific.11 It took 
only another fifty-eight years to establish state governments throughout the region. 
On the one hand, the United States’ settlement of the American West offers a 
breathtaking example of territorial expansion and administrative nation-building; 
on the other, however, it offers the violent story of colonial and military 
displacement of North American indigenous populations—a displacement followed 
by the ongoing legalistic expansion of a plenary and paternalistic control of tribal 
peoples and resources.12 Today, more than a century later, we continue to work to 
resolve the conflicts, inequities, and policy implications set in motion during this 
period. 
As the United States expanded westward, the norms of constitutional 
federalism evolved generally to privilege state primacy in local water allocations.13 
Toward the end of the United States’ period of westward expansion, however, in 
United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company, the United States 
Supreme Court reasserted the superiority of federal law,14 holding that Congress’s 
 
 9. Louisiana Purchase Treaty, Fr.-U.S., Apr. 30, 1803, 2 Stat. 245. 
 10. Gadsden Treaty, Mex.-U.S., Jun. 8, 1854, 10 Stat. 1031. 
 11. Proclamation, 37 Stat. 1728 (Feb. 14, 1912) (proclaiming statehood for Arizona, the last of the 
continental states to enter the Union). 
 12. E.g., COHEN’S, supra note 2, §§ 5.01-5.03, at 383-405 (2005); See also, Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 221 (1903) (concluding federal plenary authority empowers the United States 
to unilaterally abrogate treaties with American Indian tribes in the disposition of tribal land resources); 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380, 384-85 (1886) (concluding federal plenary authority vests 
Congress with requisite authority to enact statutes for the regulation of affairs internal to tribal 
communities without regard to constitutional basis or consideration of lack of tribal political franchise in 
federal systems). 
 13. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653, 656-63 (1978) (discussing statutory history of 
federal water development as basis for deference to state law). 
 14. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,174 U.S. 690, 703-06 (1899). 
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practice of deferring to state law water allocation systems did not, of itself, signal 
the United States’ abandonment of its constitutional prerogatives with respect to 
broader federal interests, thus providing the fundamental conflict line in western 
water battles—competing assertions of state and federal rights and authority.15 
Within the decade, the Court decided United States v. Winans16 and 
Winters v. United States,17 a pair of rulings that frame the tribal reserved rights 
doctrine—a rule of the federal common law of Indian affairs that holds, first, a 
tribal nation reserves to itself those rights not ceded by treaty or direct operation of 
federal law18 and, second, the United States reserves from public use water sufficient 
to accomplish its purpose when it sets aside land for the use and benefit of an 
American Indian tribe.19 Given the affirmation of paramount federal law, tribal 
reserved rights have long been held to be outside the presumed ambit of substantive 
state primacy,20 providing the next and most relevant conflict line—the bounds of 
tribal versus state right and authority.  
Throughout the Twentieth Century, the legal and factual situation grew 
more complex. For reasons remote from (and typically contrary to) tribal interests, 
the federal government engaged in massive reclamation projects that fostered an 
explosion in water development and dramatically altered the physical nature and 
operation of the region’s watercourses.21 Operating in conjunction with local water 
law systems and the economics and politics that drove them, these projects 
contributed to a significant over-allocation and eventual over-utilization of water 
resources as overseen by an expanding and increasingly conflicted federal-state 
water bureaucracy,22 typically to the detriment of tribes whose reserved rights had 
yet to be perfected.23 These dynamics gave rise to two lasting characteristics of our 
water laws: first, the vesting of diverse, overlapping, and conflicting sovereign, 
proprietary, and equitable interests in a limited resource; and second, the evolution 
of a complex body of federal statutes and regulations24 designed to address 
 
 15. E.g., Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority 
Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 242-67 (2006). 
 16. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
 17. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
 18. E.g., COHEN’S, supra n.2, § 2.02[2] (describing Supreme Court conceptualization of “an Indian 
treaty as a grant of rights from the tribe to the United States, with the tribe reserving for itself all 
interests not clearly ceded,” which rule is a fundamental element of the reserved rights doctrine). 
 19. E.g., id. § 19.02 (describing implied reservation of water rights recognized in Winters in 
relation to rights recognized in Winans). 
 20. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); See also, New Mexico v. 
Aamodt, et al., 537 F.2d 1102, 1111 (1976). 
 21. E.g., Marc Reisner, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 
145-213 (1986); See also, Hollon, supra n.1, at 160-80. 
 22. See, Donald J. Pisani, WATER, LAND, AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY 
1-49 (1996). 
 23. See, U.S. National Water Commission, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 476 (1973) 
(observing “in the water-short West, billions of dollars have been invested, much of it by the Federal 
Government, in water resource projects benefiting non-Indians but using water in which the Indians 
have a priority of right if they choose to develop water projects of their own in the future”), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-hd1694-a57-1973/html/CZIC-hd1694-a57-1973.htm. 
 24. See generally, Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1388; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321- 4370m-12. 
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environmental and public participation considerations not present when the original 
infrastructure and water use allocation systems were developed and implemented. 
These characteristics provide our next set of conflicting interests, neither of which 
neatly conform to a “one versus another” construct—first, non-tribal property right 
claimants who are general beneficiaries, both legally and politically, of state water 
law allocation systems but are also frequently vested in the operation of federal 
water projects; and, second, non- government public interest groups engaged in the 
implementation of major federal environmental statutes or public lands law. In 
addition to implicating tribal, state, and federal governmental interests, these 
complex aggregations of non-governmental interest introduce to the mix non-tribal 
use-rights arising under state law and non-property use-value interests represented 
by advocacy organizations.25 
Meanwhile, as the facts and associated interests grew more complex, only 
modest progress was made in converting tribal reserved right claims to meaningful 
value. In the century since the Court issued its Winans and Winters decisions, two 
challenges have predominated: First, with respect to the particulars of water law, 
neither ruling offered much in the form of guidance as to how to disentangle tribal 
from state sovereignty interests or tribal property rights from those claimed under 
state law.26 Second, efforts to develop fair and workable claims resolution have so 
far produced only limited success. Those ongoing efforts at disentanglement, 
definition, and resolution turn on a consistent practical question: What is the legally 
actionable definition of each tribe’s reserved right as applied within a fact pattern 
that typically has been shaped by state law normative water right systems and 
competing non-tribal legal, equity, and policy interests?27 Without a concrete 
answer to that question, everything else remains provisional and uncertain, at least 
for tribes and those whose rights may be subject to a federal law-based tribal claim. 
It is through this thicket of colonial legacy, constitutional law and 
federalism, national growth, tribal sovereignty, private property, economic interest, 
and environmental law and policy that each tribal-state water conflict, particularly 
in the West,28 must find its way. For those planning the trip, pack a lunch, for that 
is not an easy path to walk. 
 
 25. The terms “use-right” and “use-value” are intended to highlight the distinction between: (1) a 
right based on possession of a proprietary interest, the exercise of which is typically for purposes of a 
private good; and (2) a social utility or non-proprietary public good served by a certain mode of water 
use, such as leaving a flow in situ to support ecological, aesthetic, recreational, or other indirect 
economic values. 
 26. See, Greetham, supra note 5, at 594-99 (offering an overview of the significance and limitations 
of Winans and Winters in disentangling the specific substance of tribal water rights from state law 
normative riparian or appropriative water allocation systems). Cf. Pisani, supra note 22, at 170 (noting 
the Bureau of Reclamation’s early inter-agency insistence on quantification of tribal claims in accord 
with state law appropriative rules rather than reserved right principles). 
 27. See, Greetham, supra note 5, at 599 n.17 (discussing significance of distinction between 
defining versus quantifying tribal reserved rights). Cf., Daniel McCool, Native Waters: Contemporary 
Indian Water Settlements In The Second Treaty Era 32 (2002) (Tribal governments are increasingly 
turning from courtroom battles to practical efforts to translate their paper rights into tangible benefits for 
the reservation.). 
 28. While reserved rights are typically associated with western water and tribal reservation land 
contexts, it merits noting that legal scholars have long contested that limitation, See, Hope M. Babcock, 
Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions: Water, Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some 
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B. Situated Perspectives 
Conflicts over common pool resources, such as water, can be uniquely 
complex. Each water system presents its own hydrologic and ecologic context and 
characteristics, but as political scientists Edela Schlager and William Blomquist 
note, heterogeneity among resource user interests also significantly contributes to 
common pool conflict complexity. These variations “present real challenges to 
gaining a common understanding of their shared problems, to communication, to 
devising fair rules of access and use, and to monitoring and enforcement of those 
rules.”29 In turn, this diversity informs perspectives on the disputed resource itself, 
introducing another level of complexity, i.e., each individual actor’s sense of the 
problem to be solved.30 While the particular setting and sets of interests, 
perspectives, and senses of the problem must be carefully assessed on their own 
terms and in the context of a particular conflict,31 the broad historical, legal, and 
policy setting of western water conflicts allows us, at least for present purposes, to 
outline an archetypal set of interests, the contours of which help us to understand 
the shape and flavor of what parties bring to the table and what they seek from 
engagement. 
1. American Indian Tribes 
The peoples indigenous to North America are diverse in their histories, 
cultures, and the landscapes that comprise their homelands. Regardless of that 
diversity, a significant commonality is tribal status as political and cultural 
collectives that, similar to other collectives, seek recognition of and respect for 
their distinct identity and right to exist as such. Federal Indian law and policy 
scholar Charles Wilkinson discusses this as the goal of achieving “a measured 
separatism”—one that differs from the goals of other cultural or ethnic groups 
engaged in civil rights struggles in that it seeks not only a normative equality of 
individual rights but also a group right to “homelands . . . islands of tribalism 
largely free from interference” from non-tribal systems, including state 
governments.32 Notwithstanding the diminished and checker-boarded tribal 
jurisdictions that have resulted from various and conflicting federal policies, the 
 
Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203 (2006); Judith V. Royster, Winters in the East: Tribal 
Reserved Rights to Water in Riparian States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 169 (2000-
2001); Taiawagi Helton, Indian Reserved Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA L.J. 
979 (1998). More importantly, negotiating parties appear likewise not to have seen themselves as so 
limited. E.g., Water Infrastructure Improvement for the Nation Act, Pub. L. 114-322, § 3608, 33 Stat 2 
(Dec. 16, 2016) (approving, among others, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and the Chickasaw Nation 
Water Settlement); Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 100-228, § 7, 101 Stat. 1560 
(Dec. 31, 1987) (approving Seminole Nation water rights compact); Kickapoo Tribe Water Rights 
Settlement Agreement (settlement pending federal approval) (on file with author). 
 29. Schlager and Blomquist, supra note 6, at 1. 
 30. William M. Adams, et al., Managing Tragedies: Understanding Conflict Over Common Pool 
Resources, 302 SCIENCE 1915, 1915-16 (2003). 
 31. Schlager & Blomquist, supra note 6, at 3 (commending use of Elinor Ostrom’s institutional 
analysis and development framework). 
 32. Charles Wilkinson, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW, at 14 (1987). Accord Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL 
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA xxxv-xxxvi (2005). 
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core tribal goal remains: To exist and thrive as unique political, ethnic, and cultural 
collectives—to continue.33 
Flipping the lens around, federal and state policy makers and advocates 
have frequently treated tribal “separatism” and continuance as something to be 
tolerated and managed until broader assimilationist goals can be achieved, a 
dynamic that has been present from the outset of the federal common law of 
American Indian affairs. In Worcester v. Georgia,34 example, Chief Justice 
Marshall laid out a robust framework for the protection of tribal sovereignty, 
famously holding “[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying 
its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force . . . .”35 Importantly, though, what motivated the Court’s 
opinion was not a respect for an inherent and self-evident tribal right to 
sovereignty. (Indeed, the Cherokee Nation was not even a party to the lawsuit.36) 
Instead, the Court was preoccupied with affirming an overriding federal interest in 
monopolizing relations with tribal nations free from state interference.37 Justice 
McLean’s concurring opinion underscores that this federal-state conflict was the 
Justices’ real concern: 
The exercise of self-government by the Indians, within a state, is 
undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary. . . . At best, they can 
enjoy a very limited independence within the boundaries of a 
state, and such a residence must always subject them to 
encroachments from the settlements around them; and their 
existence within a state, as a separate and independent 
community, may seriously embarrass or obstruct the operation of 
the state laws. If, therefore, it would be inconsistent with the 
political welfare of the states, and the social advance of their 
citizens, that an independent and permanent power should exist 
within their limits, this power must give way to the greater power 
which surrounds it, or seek its exercise beyond the sphere of state 
authority.38 
 
 33. Amanda J. Cobb, Understanding Tribal Sovereignty: Definitions, Conceptualizations, and 
Interpretations, AM. STUDIES 46:3/4 115, 124 (2005) (discussing Kathy Seton’s explication of 
indigenous peoplehood to emphasize “‘[t]heir struggles for self-determination are struggles to retain 
and/or regain cultural solidarity which unite them as a distinct people’”); Stephen Cornell, THE RETURN 
OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 7 (1988) (discussing the paramount tribal 
goal of “survival: the maintenance of particular sets of social relations, more or less distinct cultural 
orders, and some measure of political autonomy in the face of invasion, conquest, and loss of power”). 
 34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 35. Id. at 520. 
 36. Cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19-20(1831) (rejecting tribe’s effort to 
invoke Court’s original jurisdiction in action challenging same state laws). 
 37. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (“[T]he acts of Georgia are repugnant to the Constitution, laws and 
treaties of the United States. They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United 
States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our 
constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union.” (Emphasis added.)); see also 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (restraining legal effect of tribal alienation of 
lands in favor of centralized federal control). 
 38. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593-94 (McLean, J., concurring). 
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As a matter of doctrine, the Chief Justice’s views on federal primacy in 
federal-tribal affairs remains the rule, though the meaning of which is still regularly 
contested.39 On the other hand, the “measured separatism” the law has so far 
protected, has often wrestled with and perpetuated a colonial “otherness” problem 
for tribes in relation to the American constitutional system40—a problem illustrated 
by Justice McLean’s argument and one that is too often compounded by the 
common law’s difficulty in shaking off the rhetorics and frameworks of racism 
with which this area of federal law was founded.41 
This problematic and unsettled dynamic was made worse by the federal 
bureaucracy’s botched attempts to address the human toll of western expansion. 
For example, between 1890 and 1930—prior to which period the United States had 
forcibly contained or relocated most of the West’s tribal population to reservations 
and during which period had then allotted much of those reservation lands to 
individual ownership, both tribal and non-tribal—the government constructed a 
patchwork of tribal irrigation projects. By 1928, the United States had spent 
approximately $36 million on 150 separate projects that served nearly 700,000 
acres.42 While these projects were justified by tribal needs arising from federal 
policies that sought to impose agricultural economies on tribal peoples forced to 
live within restricted land bases, 68 percent of the acreage benefitted by these 
irrigation projects was farmed by non-Indians—illustrating the disproportionate 
non-tribal benefit derived from ostensibly tribal projects.43 Western water law and 
policy historian Donald Pisani offers this discussion of the conversion of tribal 
projects to non-tribal benefit during this period: 
The Indian Irrigation Service enjoyed modest success in the 
1890s, but that ended after Congress passed the Reclamation Act 
in 1902. Reclamation Service officials quickly recognized that 
the Indian reservations contained a great deal of land that could 
be purchased or leased by white farmers and that the proceeds 
from surplus land sales could be used to pay for reclaiming land 
owned by whites as well as Indians. In 1907, the Reclamation 
Service took over the construction of the largest irrigation 
projects on Indian reservations or former reservations—with the 
 
 39. Cf. White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-45 (1980) (establishing balancing 
test for evaluation of respective federal, tribal, and state interests relating to state effort to regulate non-
Indian activity within reservation). 
 40. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 383-84, 390-406 (1993) (analyzing the 
power-law tension inherent to the common law of federal Indian affairs and the difficulty the law has 
had in mediating the subject matter’s colonial foundation within a normative constitutional framework); 
see generally Frank Pommersheim, Is There a Little (Or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing 
in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 271 (2003). 
 41. Williams, supra note 32; David E. Wilkins, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997); cf. Stephen H. Greetham, Tribes in “Unexpected 
Places”: The NLRA, Tribal Economic Actors, and Common Law Expectations of Tribal Authenticity, 
38.4 AM. IND. Q. 427, 438-49 (2014) (analyzing challenges the common law’s understanding of “tribe” 
presents in applying concepts of tribal sovereignty in the context of modern tribal economic actors). 
 42. Peter W. Sly, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT MANUAL 14 (1988). 
 43. Id. at 15. 
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complicity, if not full support, of the Indian Office. Officials in 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs hoped that white farmers would 
serve as models to would-be Indian irrigators. Therefore, they 
encouraged whites to take up land on the former reservations.44  
As Pisani concludes, “[b]y the 1920s, the Indian irrigation projects served far more 
whites than Indians—often at the expense of the Indians.”45 
Particularly when compared with the contemporaneous socio-political and 
physical circumstance of tribal peoples46 and the plenary control asserted by the 
federal government that came to its zenith during this time,47the failure of these and 
similar federal programs to serve tribal peoples is unconscionable. But this was not 
the end of the missed opportunities: By 1975, after reallocating administration of 
non-tribal projects to the Bureau of Reclamation and retaining Bureau of Indian 
Affairs oversight of the tribal projects, the government had made $201 million in 
capital expenditures on tribal projects, though the average area under irrigation had 
dropped to 648,000 acres.48 Meanwhile the federal government spent billions to 
develop waters subject to tribal claim for predominantly non-tribal expansion and 
economic benefit.49 This entire period of development amounted largely to an 
exercise of inefficient federal paternalism, incompetently implemented and 
inadequately realized, which had the effect of empowering state and other non-
tribal interests at the expense of tribal right and benefit. 
The largest and perhaps most (in)famous example of these projects is the 
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP), a project authorized by Congress in 1962,50 
which has never been fully funded.51 While the United States originally calculated 
the Navajo Nation reserved right for the NIIP to be 787,000 acre-feet per year, non-
tribal political opposition to a tribal project of that size stymied progress and led to 
the Navajo Nation’s being pressured to accept an ostensibly guaranteed annual 
entitlement of 508,000 acre-feet, which the Department of the Interior later scaled 
back to 370,000 acre-feet, citing improved water delivery efficiencies.52 Meanwhile, 
as the Navajo’s water allocation was slashed to less than half of the government’s 
original calculation, Congress tied the appropriation of monies for the construction 
of NIIP to the San Juan-Chama Project, which was developed for the benefit of 
New Mexico—though “[e]ight years after authorization, NIIP was only seventeen 
percent completed” while “New Mexico’s San Juan-Chama project was about two-
 
 44. Pisani, supra note 22, at 161. 
 45. Id. at 161-62. 
 46. See generally Institute for Gov’t Research, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928) 
(documenting impact of prior federal policies), http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/meriam.html. 
 47. E.g., COHEN’S, supra note 2, §1.05 at 79-80; Williams, supra note 32, at 71-83, 85 n.35; 
Wilkins, supra note 41, at 105-17; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903). 
 48. Sly, supra note 42, at 16-17. 
 49. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. 
 50. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Navajo 
Indian irrigation project and the initial stage of the San Juan-Chama project as participating projects of 
the Colorado River storage project, and for other purposes, Act of Jun. 13, 1962 Pub. L. 87-483, 76 Stat. 
96 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 615ii). 
 51. Sly, supra note 42, at 17-18. 
 52. Burton, supra note 8, at 30-31. 
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thirds built.”53 Today, the Navajo Nation Council continues to work to secure the 
funding and federal commitment to complete NIIP,54 while San Juan-Chama has 
been in full operation for years. 
Finally, as the common law continued to fumble with its handling of tribal 
sovereignty, as the federal government continued to mismanage tribal assets, and as 
the state’s regulatory hand grew stronger, the slow and steady trend of the western 
water bureaucracy has been “to treat tribes like mere individual owners of water 
rights and less like sovereigns with the authority and power to govern those water 
rights within their own territories.”55 As Richard Monette frames the matter: 
Indian tribes should not own water rights. Individuals own water 
rights; sovereigns govern water rights . . . . Should tribes be more 
like individuals, who merely own water rights under the property 
scheme of some other sovereign? Or should tribes be more like 
sovereigns, with the authority and power to own water and to 
govern water rights within their respective territories and 
jurisdictions, including the power to vest individuals with 
ownership?56 
Tribes, of course, have proprietary interests in water resources, but the failure of 
the law and bureaucracy to adequately integrate both tribal sovereignty and 
proprietary interests exacerbates the difficulty for tribal leaders seeking to obtain 
that “measured separatism” with respect to their tribes’ reserved right claims. 
As a whole, this history of disregard, hostility, and mismanagement 
promotes a tribal skepticism, if not overt cynicism, when it comes to law, water 
resources, and promises of justice.57 While the particulars vary, each tribal 
government and community has some local version of this story, which tends to 
bolster a sense of distrust, both among tribal leaders and the members of the 
respective polity to which they owe a duty of responsibility and stewardship. It 
merits emphasis that much of this history of failure, including the Indian Irrigation 
Projects, is within the living memory of many tribal members and citizens—and 
many more who were raised by those individuals. Furthermore, given the tendency 
of the current Supreme Court to manifest sympathy for state interests over federal 
 
 53. Id. at 31. 
 54. See Media Release, Office of the Speaker of the 23rd Navajo Nation Council, Council moves 
forward with efforts to complete the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with 
author). 
 55. Richard Monette, One Hundred Years after Winters: The Immovable Object of Tribes’ 
Reserved Water Meets the Irresistible Force of States’ Reserved Rights under the Equal Footing 
Doctrine, in THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS 
CENTENNIAL 89 (Barbara Cosens et al., eds., 2012). 
 56. Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. Cf. Pisani, supra note 22, at 160 (discussing nature of American Indian skepticism and 
opposition to federal Indian Irrigation Projects); Burton, supra note 8, at 60 (“It is little wonder that 
while tribal leaders are not wildly enthusiastic about negotiation, many of them are reluctant to reject 
that alternative unequivocally.”). See also Berkey, supra note 5, at 2 (“Historically, Indian Tribes have 
kept the State at a distance with regard to legal and political matters, no doubt due to the hostile 
relationship between the State and the Tribes in the years following statehood and the numerous court 
battles to protect tribal water and fishing rights.”). 
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authority or tribal interests, tribal wariness of the legal system finds basis in current 
events, not only history.58 
Regardless of any skepticism, tribal leaders still must do what all 
community leaders must do: They must navigate the broader legal and political 
systems to address their communities’ material challenges with respect to securing 
reliable water supplies for human consumption, economic growth, ecological 
health, and, in many instances, particularized cultural and/or religious needs.59 
While all polities must address similar needs, tribal government must (and do) do so 
in contexts in which their governments may lack recognized legal control over the 
watersheds on which they depend60 or face opposition when the law does give them 
control61 (or even access to the possibility of a degree of control)62 and where 
poverty rates are generally high, rates of economic development comparatively 
low, and sources of government revenue constrained.63 As western and tribal water 
law scholar David Getches observed, “[t]he futures of tribes have long been 
trapped behind unclaimed, unusable water rights,”64 the truth of which speaks to 
the ultimate material interest driving tribal efforts to resolve claims: As a general 
matter, tribes want the value, utility, and benefit of legally enforceable water rights 
so they can protect their homelands and provide for their own future. But they want 
more than that, as well. 
American Indian tribes have been able to capitalize on the late-1960s shift 
in federal policy and have expanded institutional capacities in government, law, 
and economic development.65 Taking advantage of “treatment in the same manner 
 
 58. Cf. Burton, supra note8, at 34, 36-37, 61-62. 
 59. E.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role 
of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 242-47 (1996) 
(discussing unique complex of challenges relating to implementation of tribal environmental 
programming). 
 60. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, Civ. No. 16-1534 (D.D.C., Jul. 27, 2016). 
 61. See, e.g., Montana v. U.S. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (addressing challenge to EPA’s 
delegation of Clean Water Act regulatory authority to tribal environmental program); City of 
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996) (addressing challenge to EPA’s integration of 
tribal water quality standards in permitting of upstream off-reservation discharges). 
 62. See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, 
Pub. L. 109-59, § 10,211, 119 Stat. 1144 (Aug. 10, 2005) (imposing unique procedural requirements on 
tribes in Oklahoma seeking “tribes as states” status); Travis Snell, Tribal officials angry over 
transportation bill, CHEROKEE PHOENIX, May 3, 2006, http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Arti
cle/index/1417; Editorial, Filling the Bill: Inhofe’s sage rider targets tribes, OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 11, 
2005 http://newsok.com/article/2907126. 
 63. Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE 
NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 112-22 (2008). 
 64. David Getches, Foreward, to NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN 
THE ARID WEST xiv (Bonnie Colby et al., 2005). 
 65. Harvard Project, supra note 65, at 115 (observing tribes have “leverage[d] policies of self- 
determination into self-selected investments and focus on developing the legal, regulatory, and physical 
infrastructure that rewards productivity, holds decision makers accountable, and holds down the risks of 
political instability for individuals and businesses”); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest 
Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 74 (2007). 
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as states” provisions in certain major environmental statutes,66 many tribes may 
also now operate environmental programs and have promulgated standards 
governing activities within or affecting their jurisdictional territories.67 While the 
legacy of failed federal policies–e.g., poverty, unemployment, and other economic 
and associated social challenges–remains problematic throughout Indian country, 
tribal economic and governance capacities have grown, as has a collective tribal 
ability to impact matters affecting tribal communities.68 And with respect to that 
central tribal-state conflict line, federal Indian law scholar Matthew L.M. Fletcher 
argues that “American Indian law is transforming”: 
The political relationship between the United States and Indian 
tribes remains, but a new and more dynamic relationship between 
states and Indian tribes is growing. States and Indian tribes are 
beginning to smooth over the rough edges of federal Indian 
law— jurisdictional confusion, historical animosity between 
states and Indian tribes, competition between sovereigns for tax 
revenue, economic development opportunities, and regulatory 
authority— through cooperative agreements. In effect, a new 
political relationship is springing up all over the nation between 
states, local units of government, and Indian tribes. . . . Many 
states now recognize tribes as de facto political sovereigns, often 
in the form of a statement of policy whereby the state agrees to 
engage Indian tribes in a government-to-government relationship 
mirroring federal policy. The tribal-federal political relationship 
remains, but more and more tribal-state political relationships 
form every year . . . .69 
Sovereignty, as among governments, is a constant negotiation. Its exercise 
and health requires engagement and relationship, not the mere drawing of lines or 
the defining of legal rights. Monette implies this point when discussing tribes as 
sovereigns, not merely proprietors, and David Wilkins and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesilk 
Stark state the point more directly when arguing that tribal survival has long 
“necessitated the practice of aboriginal sovereigns negotiating political compacts, 
treaties, and alliances with European nations and later the United States.”70 All of 
this, Wilkins and Kiiwetinepinesilk Stark argue, is part of a broader “governmental 
interdependency” that is inherent to the modern exercise of all sovereignties, 
requiring the constant negotiation, development, and maintenance of relationships 
 
 66. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(2012); Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1377(e) 
(2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2012); Stephen Greetham, Native American Sovereignty 
and the Clean Water Act: The Historic Judicial Treatment of Tribal Sovereign Powers and Recent 
Statutory Reforms, 3 N.U. FORUM 1 (1998); Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality 
Standards Dispute: Legal Basis for Tribal Regulatory Authority over Non-Indian Reservation Lands, 20 
AM. IND. L. REV. 151 (1995-1996). 
 67. See supra note 61 and 66. 
 68. Harvard Project, supra note 63, at 117-21. 
 69. Fletcher, supra note 65, at 74; see also Harvard Project, supra note 63, at 72-77. 
 70. David E. Wilkins & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesilk Stark, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 34 (2011). 
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between and among sovereigns.71 Scholars have disputed the wisdom and utility of 
tribal engagement with non-tribal political systems;72 as political scientist Daniel 
McCool puts the question, can a “strategy of political compromise, via an alien 
system of values, truly protect the long-term best interests of Indian tribes?”73 
However, given that water is typically a trans-jurisdictional matter, engagement—
in one form or another—is largely unavoidable, and ultimately the success of any 
engagement will be shaped by the health of the relationship of the engaged 
parties.74 
While not uniform throughout Indian country, the growth in tribal 
government institutions and economic development has created expanding 
opportunities for mutually beneficial intergovernmental alliance. The opportunity 
for conflict will always inhere to the tribal-state dynamic, but as former Arizona 
Governor Bruce Babbitt said on the subject: 
This is not a problem, it’s an opportunity . . . . What we have is 
an intergovernmental environment in which, if we could just quit 
thinking of Indian tribes and nations as problems and start 
thinking of them as peoples, communities, and governmental 
units, we can get on which business and make it happen.75 
The act of claiming and securing tangible, material value in the provision of 
reliable access to necessary waters is, of course, a paramount tribal goal, but tribes 
generally seek not only the water; they also seek intergovernmental relationships 
that are respectful of their status as recognized political collectives and which 
integrate them, as such, into the broader “governmental interdependency” of 
sovereignty. They seek a mode of integration that affords “a measured separation” 
within, not barred from, the evolving American legal, political, and cultural 
dynamic.76 In short, in addition to water rights, tribes are generally looking for 
partners who approach them in the same spirit commended by former Governor 
Babbitt. 
 
 71. Id. at 38. (citing Valerie Lambert, CHOCTAW NATION: A STORY OF AMERICAN INDIAN 
RESURGENCE 211 (2007)). 
 72. Compare Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native 
Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 
15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107 (1999), (arguing the imposition of United States citizenship on 
indigenous peoples was a unilateral act of colonization and advocating repeal of the Indian Citizenship 
Act and indigenous resistance and general withdrawal from non-indigenous political processes) with 
John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in American Politics: 
A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533 (2001), (responding and arguing in 
rebuttal to Porter’s article). See also Carol Goldberg and Duane Champagne, Ramona Redeemed? The 
Rise of Tribal Political Power in California, WICAZO SA R. 17.1 at 44 (2002). 
 73. McCool, supra note 27, at 9. 
 74. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 30, at 1916. 
 75. Colby, supra note 64, at 33. 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes32-33; see also Cobb, supra note 33, at 119-20 (discussing 
inherency of sovereignty but its “political effect” as dependent on relational recognition). 
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2. State Governments 
While American Indian tribes wrestle with the challenge of colonial 
“otherness,” states occupy a privileged position within the federal system. Though, 
among the fundamental tensions inherent in the United States’ Constitution is the 
exact metes and bounds of state versus federal power, states—particularly western 
states—have consistently asserted their rights against perceived federal 
overreach.77 With respect to the control and local allocation of water, states assert 
those rights from a reasonably solid foundation. 
The legal control and local allocation of water was largely an afterthought 
in the federal government’s implementation of western expansion. With the 
passage of the Homestead Act of 1862,78 Congress opened the vast western public 
domain to lawful private settlement, and the resulting flood of migration increased 
local needs for works to provide water for domestic, industrial, and agricultural use 
throughout the predominantly arid region. As most of the land remained in federal 
title, much of those works were constructed on federal lands.79 Soon thereafter 
Congress enacted the Mining Act of 1866, signaling its deference with respect to 
private rights to the continued use of water in accord with “local customs, laws, and 
the decisions of the courts.”80 As the California Supreme Court tells the Story: 
For a long period the general government stood silently by and 
allowed its citizens to occupy a great part of its public domain in 
California, and to locate and hold mining claims, water rights, 
etc., according to such rules as could be made applicable to the 
peculiar situation; and, when there were contests between hostile 
claimants, the courts were compelled to decide them without 
reference to the ownership of the government, as it was not urged 
or presented. In this way, from 1849 to 1866, a system had grown 
up under which the rights of locators on the public domain, as 
between themselves, were determined, which left out of view the 
paramount title of the government.81 
 
 77. See In re U.S. Dep’t of Def,, U.S. E.P.A. Final Rule: Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of 
U.S., 817 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2016), cert granted sub nom. Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 137 
S.Ct 811, 196 L. Ed. 2D 595 (2017); see also Memorandum from U.S. EPA and U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers on Administration of Clean Water Programs in Light of the Stay of the Clean Water Rule, 
Improving Transparency and Strengthening Coordination (Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/2015-11-16_signed_cwr_post-
stay_coordination_memo.pdf (This conflict line has flared most recently in relation to the Army Corps 
of Engineers’ and Environmental Protection Agency’s promulgation of Clean Water Act jurisdictional 
rules, which are now heading to the Supreme Court). 
 78. Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392, Ch. 75. 
 79. E.g., California, 438 U.S. 645 at 656 (1978). 
 80. Mining Act of 1866, 39 Cong. Ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253, 43 U.S.C. § 661. 
 81. Cave v. Tyler, 133 Cal. 566, 567, 65 P. 1089, 1090 (1901). Accord A. Dan. Tarlock, et al., 
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 106 (2009) (“In 
settlement of the West, Congress’s silence about water rights on the public lands had been at once 
confusing and convenient. The states did as they pleased.”). 
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Next, Congress enacted the Desert Lands Act of 1877,82 the central act of 
congressional deference in this area of the law and which the Supreme Court has 
interpreted as effecting a severance of non-navigable waters within the enumerated 
western states and a general reservation of those waters “for the use of the public 
under the laws of the states and territories.”83 Finally Congress enacted the 
Reclamation Act of 190284 to authorize the construction of massive works to 
supplement local supply infrastructure for expanding non-tribal settlement, 
agriculture, and industry.85 The Court has since interpreted the Reclamation Act as 
generally subordinating federal operation of projects built under its authority to 
state water allocation rules and administration.86 
In the words of Justice Rehnquist, this statutory history manifests “the 
consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by 
Congress”87 though, as already noted, not without exception.88 Paramount federal 
sovereignty interests have not been waived by this tradition of deference,89 nor have 
the nature and extent of reserved tribal water rights been subordinated to state 
substantive law.90 
With respect to state substantive water law, those laws generally perform 
three functions: They establish the rule system by which persons obtain new water 
rights, they provide adjudicative processes for the determination of existing water 
rights, and they administer the ongoing use, transfer, and distribution of established 
water rights.91 The existence of inchoate federal reserved rights can challenge state-
led efforts in system-wide water management and complicate administrative efforts 
to define and administer property rights.92 This has particularly, though not 
exclusively, been a concern in normatively appropriative systems.93 
 
 82. Desert Lands Act of 1877, Ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. 321. 
 83. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935); see 
also California, 438 U.S. 645 at 657. 
 84. Reclamation Act of 1902, Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 43 U.S.C. 416. 
 85. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 at 663. 
 86. Id. at 667-70. 
 87. Id. at 653. 
 88. See U.S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).Cf. Tarlock, supra note 
81, at 107 (“Many years after Winters the Supreme Court said that, simply passing three post-Civil War 
statutes that scarcely mentioned water, Congress had deferred to the states to fashion their own water 
law systems. 
 89. See U.S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703-07 (1899). 
 90. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 570-571 (1983). 
 91. Conference of Western Attorneys General, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 587 (Mazurek, 
Joseph et al. eds., 2014). 
 92. See Oklahoma v. Tyson, 258 F.R.D. 472, 479 (N.D. Okla. 2009) (dismissing state damages 
claim based on procedural implications arising from unresolved tribal water rights claims). See also 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 76 MONTANA L. REV. 97, 97 (2015). The 
rights of tribes and tribal populations can also be challenged. See id. at 99. (describing generally and in 
contemporary context the relationship and relative power of tribes and tribal populations with respect to 
state electoral and political systems, as contrasted with the tribal-federal trust relationship). 
 93. Royster supra note 28 at 169 (“With one partial exception, Indian reserved rights to water have 
been litigated only for reservations located in states following the prior appropriation system of state 
water law rights.”). 
Winter 2018 WATER PLANNING 17 
Starting early in the Twentieth Century, many western state legislatures 
adopted water codes that provided for comprehensive water rights adjudications.94 
Limitations on state substantive jurisdiction and the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity, however, placed reserved rights outside the reach of state law 
adjudication proceedings; indeed, the Justice Department consistently used the 
reserved rights doctrine for defensive purposes only, i.e., to enjoin non-tribal 
diversions or state proceedings it viewed as contrary to federal interests,95 which 
thwarted state authority to conduct comprehensive water right adjudications.96 In 
1952, Congress opened the door for such state authority by enacting the McCarran 
Amendment,97 which serves to waive federal immunities in state-led stream 
adjudications. Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has construed it as opening 
the door for state court determinations of federal reserved right claims,98 and 
subsequent litigation suggests a general rule that state courts are not only available 
for these actions but may be the preferred forum—even where tribal water rights 
are at issue.99 
Tribes have continued to challenge the states’ procedural hold on the 
litigation of tribal water rights,100 but state privilege has burrowed deep roots.101 In 
short, states have spent considerable institutional, financial, and political capital on 
securing the legal authority to control the relevant litigated processes. 
This procedural advantage notwithstanding, states do not run the table. 
The Supreme Court has consistently and unambiguously reaffirmed that federal 
law, not state, controls the substance of tribal reserved rights.102 While this rule 
may be of debatable immediate value to federal and tribal interests, given 
McCarran’s empowering of state courts to take the first pass on the questions 
presented,103 federal law’s substantive primacy continues to increase transactional 
 
 94. E.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U. S., 424 U.S. 800, 804 (1976). 
 95. E.g., Winters v. U. S., 207 U.S. 564, 565, (1908) (the United States seeking, and obtaining, 
relief in the form of enjoining non-tribal water use, rather than a definition of the tribal water right 
itself). 
 96. COHEN’S, supra note 2, at 19.05[1] (“Historically, the states lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over Indian water rights.”). 
 97. See 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012). 
 98. U.S. v. Dist. Ct. In and For Eagle County, Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971). 
 99. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 570 (1983) (rejecting secondary 
assault on Colorado River abstention); U.S. for and on Behalf of Acoma and Laguna Indian Pueblos v. 
Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation Dist. of New Mexico, 806 F.2d. 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) 
(affirming denial of removal effort). 
 100. E.g., Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d 244, 250 (Mont. 1999) 
(holding state jurisdiction over water resources limited unless determination made regarding quantity of 
water “legally available,” which could not be determined without quantification of tribal reserved 
rights). See also e.g., Oklahoma Water Res. Bd. v. United States, et al., Civ. No. 12-275 (Mar. 12, 2012) 
(motion to remove state stream adjudication to federal court). 
 101. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. at 570 (rejecting secondary assault on Colorado 
River abstention); Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation Dist. of New Mexico, 806 F.2d. 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(per curiam) (affirming denial of removal effort). 
 102. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 571, 580 (1983). 
 103. See, e.g., Scott B. McElroy & Jeff. J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. United States—There Must Be a Better Way, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 597, 599, 618 (1995) 
(analyzing state court handling of the substantive law of federal reserved rights). 
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complexity, risk, and cost—factors which bear directly on state government pursuit 
of clean and clear resolutions. In short, no matter the litigated and legislated 
successes of state governments, formal resolution of reserved rights—of water 
rights, in general—remains hard, expensive, and polarizing work.104 States have, 
accordingly, supported increased federal investment in achieving negotiated 
resolutions—acting in the belief that formal negotiations will provide a surer path 
to workable resolution.105 
Finally, surrounding the tribal-state relationship are the myriad of water 
resource regulatory and policy responsibilities the state owes to its state-law 
constituents. As Peter Sly puts it, “the state is like a ‘traffic cop’” with a “primary 
interest” in the supervision and “administ[ration] of state- created water rights in a 
comprehensive and simplified process, to minimize surprises and uncertainties for 
water users.”106 Given the predominance and diversity of the exercise of those 
“state-created water rights” and the privileged status federal law has afforded state 
regulation of them, the state’s role as “traffic cop” can be fairly viewed as less a 
desire to thwart tribal rights and sovereignty and more simply as a public duty—
one that strongly informs, if not drives, its interests in these matters. 
In sum, states continue to seek not only resolution of reserved rights but 
workable resolutions that support regulatory stability. If it is acceptable to 
repurpose Justice McLean’s sour argument in Worcester, it may be fair to say states 
seek a resolution to reserved rights on terms that do not “seriously embarrass or 
obstruct the operation of state laws.”107 It is one thing to say that reserved rights lie 
outside the reach of state authority; it is another (and far more complicated) thing to 
arrive at legally actionable definitions of those reserved rights in a manner that 
does justice to the claim while integrating them to a broader property rights system 
without undue prejudice or harm to other lawful and equitable interests vested 
under state law. The first statement presents the conflict; the second offers a form 
of fair resolution. The consequence of our shared history is complex and 
challenging, but states—like all sovereigns—are not inclined to abandon local 
interests or claimed governmental rights based solely on appeals to that history. 
Instead, fundamental to the approach of state regulators and political leaders in 
these matters is a path to reconciliation that does minimal violence to current legal, 
property, and power systems. 
3. The Other Parties 
The tribal-state relationship, of course, does not exist in isolation. Multiple 
other actors have relevant affected interests, and each has its own relationship, 
common cause, and conflict with tribal and/or state sovereigns—most prominently, 
the United States, non-tribal use-right claimants, and use-value advocacy 
organizations. 
 
 104. See, e.g., Rhett Larson & Kelly Kennedy, Bankrupt Rivers, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1335, 1358-
59 (2016) (discussing high cost and transactional uncertainty of stream adjudications). 
 105. E.g., Western States Water Council, Resolution (Position No. 376) In Support of Indian Water 
Rights Settlements (Oct. 10, 2014) (on file with author). 
 106. See generally Sly, supra note 42, at 47, 44-54. 
 107. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 594. 
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Of the other parties involved, the United States is the most complex. As 
prime mover of the nation’s western expansion, it implemented a series of policies 
designed to remove tribal populations to small corners of their pre-expansion 
aboriginal homelands.108 These homelands were then made ready for non-tribal 
settlement through the construction of massive reclamation and other water 
infrastructure projects.109 As legacy of this history, the United States today owes a 
myriad of public responsibilities, in addition to its role as fiduciary of the federal-
tribal trust.110 Historian Patricia Nelson Limerick describes the government’s 
arguably untenable position as follows: 
By 1980, Interior’s jurisdiction was a crazy mosaic. Overseeing 
the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the 
Bureau of Mines, the Geological Survey, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the secretary of the interior wore more hats than a 
head could support. The interests of mining, for instance, were 
often in conflict with the interests of wildlife, of Indian people, 
and of national parks. Beyond the likelihood of conflicting 
interests among bureaus, the range of each bureau could make 
the head spin.111 
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance in sorting out management of this 
mess.112 Instead offering its own complications by affirming the primacy of state 
and local water allocation laws.113 
As a result of this network of sovereign and proprietary rights, statutory 
and common law duties, and concurrent status as sovereign, developer, and trustee, 
there are few water issues in which the United States does not have a vested 
interest.114 As sovereign, it must act as steward of national interests, which includes 
enactment and implementation of water and natural resource protection systems 
 
 108. E.g., COHEN’S, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing sweep of tribal land losses); See also COHEN’S, 
supra note 2, at 23-30, 38-41, 79-84 (discussing arc of federal policies implementing the diminishment 
of tribal lands and resources); Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, supra note 
62, at 95-98. 
 109. See supra notes 1, 21-23 and accompanying text. 
 110. E.g., Colby, supra note 64 at 14-18; Cohen, supra note 2, at 412-416. 
 111. Patricia Nelson Limerick, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE 
AMERICAN WEST 307 (2011). Accord Mather, supra note 1, at 305 (“Clearly, many [federal programs 
dealing with water resources development and management] overlap and conflict. It is certain that even 
the agencies involved do not know of all possible conflicting or supporting programs in other agencies 
or, even possibly, the full ramifications of the programs they have been authorized to establish or 
enforce within their own agencies.”). 
 112. See Nevada v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (“The Government does not ‘compromise’ its 
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performs another task for another interest that Congress has obliged it by statute to do.”); E.g., id. at 135 
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 113. See California v. U. S., 438 U.S. 645, 656 (1978). 
 114. See, e.g., Mather, supra note 1, at 302 (“Current federal water laws and programs are quite 
complex. More than forty federal agencies have some water programs or statutory responsibilities and 
the programs keep changing.”). 
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such as the Clean Water Act115 and the Endangered Species Act.116 Using its 
financial and scientific resources, the government also acts in its sovereign capacity 
by funding technical studies intended to better inform water resource management 
and environmental protection efforts.117 As proprietor, the government acts to 
protect its rights appurtenant to federal reserved lands and water infrastructure118 
and, likewise, to fulfill its contractual obligations to derivative property right 
holders who enjoy the use of those federal assets.119 Finally, as trustee, it has an 
obligation to represent the interests of tribal sovereigns who hold reserved rights to 
water resources as well as jurisdictional authorities relating to the use and 
enjoyment of those resources.120 The government’s balance of these varied and 
conflicting interests is driven less by the law and more by executive and legislative 
branch politics and policy, with the courts simply playing referee pursuant to 
statutory, common law, or constitutional standards.121 In short, government tends to 
be on no one party’s side in any water dispute but, instead, manages what it views 
as its interests in accord with predominating law, policies, and politics. 
While the federal government could be understood as a single entity with 
a myriad of interests, non-tribal property right claimants are a myriad of entities 
with a singular—though individually held—interest, i.e., a property right in the use 
of water, a right which is generally governed by and within a state law water 
allocation system. Such use-rights are held by towns and cities, irrigators and 
ranchers, energy producers and power plants, large industry, and individual 
homeowners.122 Given the nature of state verses federal politics, these claimants 
generally have a strong interest in protecting the state’s regulatory and management 
role.123 Echoing the federal-state conflict line, this tendency can put tribal and non-
tribal claimants at odds. 
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RIVER BASIN TEN TRIBES PARTNERSHIP IN TRIBALLY FOCUSED WATER STUDY (2013); U.S. BUREAU 
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Finally, use-value advocates also have a significant role in these matters. 
Environmental groups and recreational users are not frequent participants in tribal 
water disputes, but they are regular participants in water fights more generally, 
typically relying on federal statutory systems that secure public participation rights 
to advocate positions framed as serving the public’s interest, such as environmental 
protection and government and corporate accountability.124 
4. The Interests Aggregated 
Much of the complexity summarized above arises out of, on the one hand, 
the unique relationship between tribal sovereigns and the federal government and, 
on the other hand, the unique competition between tribal and state sovereigns. 
Viewing it as a whole, its contours drape a generalized structure built on 
sovereignty and proprietary considerations: Sovereignty concerns (primarily 
represented by tribal, state, and federal government parties) that focus on questions 
of control, authority, autonomy, and certainty; and proprietary concerns (primarily 
represented by use-right claimants, both tribal and non-tribal, and use-value 
advocates such as environmental or other policy organizations) that focus on 
maximal realization of an individualized material value (i.e., amount of water 
reliably obtained for a desired use-right or use-value, such as for municipal, 
agricultural, recreation, fish and wildlife, or other purposes). 
From tribes (seeking a “measured separatism” and dynamic 
intergovernmental relations) to states (seeking to protect a privileged legal position 
with respect to the implementation of administrative regulatory systems necessary 
for ecological and economic health) to the United States (acting on its crazy quilt of 
interests and obligations) and all the use-right and use-value interests entangled 
among them, each party brings legitimate concerns to the table. These interests are 
each informed and shaped by history, culture, law, and context, and each, in turn, 
shapes the nature of the conflict to be addressed—a conflict that typically goes far 
beyond the water resource itself and, instead, ought to be viewed as part of ongoing 
efforts to reconcile America’s colonial past with its constitutional present.125 
In short, this is about more than water.126 
C. Traditional Tactics and Paths to Resolution 
Parties typically seek resolution among this rowdy set of interests by 
reliance on traditional adversarial means, i.e., litigation or the nominally more 
cooperative approach of formal negotiations. Regardless of approach, the law 
requires resolution of reserved rights claims to include finality and enforceability of 
right.127 Exclusive focus on enforceable finality, however, tends to deepen conflict 
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by miring the parties in pie-cutting zero-sum games, thus restricting combatants to 
distributive competition rather than facilitating integrative cooperation. Each 
approach, in its own way, has proven itself to be less than ideal. 
For much of the Twentieth Century, litigation has been the primary tool 
for addressing reserved rights to water,128 but such reliance has proven expensive, 
polarizing, and not certain to provide clear or transportable results—in a word, 
unsatisfactory. The adjudication of the rights of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern 
Arapahoe tribes often serves as an illustration of the limited efficacy of litigation: 
After thirty-seven years, including seven trips to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the 
tribes are still unable to fully utilize their substantial decreed water right without 
continued conflict and uncertainty.129 Meanwhile, lingering uncertainty due to 
adversarial relations continues to inhibit economic growth and forestall ecological 
restoration efforts.130 Another illustration of litigation’s limitations can be found in 
northern New Mexico, where it took approximately twenty-seven years to produce 
a useable legal standard for determining Pueblo water rights,131 after which a 
separate district court concluded it was not bound by the product of those efforts 
leaving the parties free to litigate the questions anew.132 Indeed, underscoring a 
level of frustration with his state’s experience, former New Mexico State Engineer 
John D’Antonio estimated it would take “another 600 years to complete the 
adjudication of water rights” within its jurisdiction if it continued at its current 
pace.133 
With these experiences in mind, it is not hard to understand why parties 
started taking a step back and moved from the courtroom to the conference table.134 
In 1979, for example, Montana established its Reserved Water Rights Compact 
Commission to represent the state in efforts to negotiate settlements of outstanding 
reserved right claims.135 Around that same time, the Conference of Western 
Attorneys General reached out to the Native American Rights Fund to, likewise, 
explore the development of standard practice and procedural norms for securing 
enforceable settlements, which resulted in the 1988 publication of the RESERVED 
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WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT MANUAL136 and years of coordinated tribal-state 
advocacy at the federal level for deeper federal commitment to resolution of 
reserved rights claims.137 
Since the 1980s, the value of the multi-party and congressionally-
approved negotiated settlement has been accepted, almost as an article of faith, as 
the preferred method of formal tribal reserved right dispute resolution, though the 
record suggests one may want to hold to that faith with something less than 
righteous enthusiasm.138 Since, 1978, when Congress approved the Ak-Chin Indian 
Water Rights Settlement Act,139 the first express settlement of tribal water rights 
claims, only forty-four of the more than 560 federally recognized American Indian 
tribes have obtained a formal settlement of their claims,140 with twelve settlements 
accomplished during the Obama Administration alone.141 This progress marks a 
significant collective achievement, but it remains slow work. As the Western Water 
Policy Review Advisory Committee observed nearly twenty years ago, negotiation 
has its own limitations: 
[N]egotiated settlements are not an easy solution. They rely on 
the willingness of parties to negotiate. Delays and political 
maneuvering are often considerable. Settlements generally must 
be ratified by the Congress and, in most instances, need judicial 
recognition to be effective. Most importantly, settlements 
generally rely on large infusions of federal funds to provide 
additional water for tribes without damaging the rights of other 
water users. Federal budgetary concerns will probably restrict 
funding of new water settlements and project-based solutions. 
Accordingly, future negotiators will have to be even more 
creative.142 
The overall pace of settlement seems to justify the Committee’s 
cautionary tone and, more dauntingly, suggests—like New Mexico’s former State 
Engineer once estimated for his state143—it may take as much as another half a 
millennium to resolve the reserved right claims of the more than five hundred 
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federally recognized tribes that have not yet converted (or, for many, even yet 
stated) their claims. That is a sobering prospect. 
Thus, more than a century after the Court decided Winans and Winters, we 
find ourselves acknowledging tribal sovereignty and proprietary rights as a general 
matter but having produced few specifically-defined and enforceable articulations 
of those rights. That lack of finality notwithstanding, tribal and non-tribal 
communities, public water suppliers, resource users, and others continue to wrestle 
with exigencies driven by shifting use-value priorities, climate variability, and 
aging infrastructure—exigencies that demand analysis and decision, even if only 
provisionally. This is a circumstance ripe for creative thinking and reform. 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR WATER PLANNING AS A 
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROACH: ITS EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION 
IN THE TRIBAL-STATE CONTEXT 
Tribal water right litigation and negotiation efforts are fundamentally 
organized around that single, practical question: What is the legally actionable 
definition of each tribe’s reserved right as applied within a fact pattern that 
typically has been shaped by state law normative water right systems and 
competing non-tribal legal, equity, and policy interests?144 Answering the question, 
though, is not the end itself; the question serves to organize efforts intent on 
reconciling competing interests within a framework with which our legal systems 
can deal, i.e., rights. Our aspiration in resorting to those mechanisms is to create a 
level of certainty that will allow our pursuit of material goals, ideally without 
prejudice to or caused by our neighbor, e.g., development of water supplies, 
restoration of habitat, support for diverse economic development efforts, etc. 
Leaving aside the legal system’s focus on rights and the ultimate requirement for 
enforceable finality, water planning efforts are generally driven by the same 
aspiration.145 Given the demonstrable limitations of our legal systems for efficiently 
achieving the goal, water resource planning appears to be a reasonable 
supplemental approach. 
A. Water Planning as an Evolving Resource Management Tool 
Water planning has become an increasingly popular tool for assessing 
water resource policy and management challenges and options.146 Evolving from an 
engineering tool originally used to develop disaggregated, single-purpose 
projects,147 water planning today requires an interdisciplinary and comprehensive 
approach to address a growing list of scientific, political, and use-value 
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uncertainties.148 This evolution in practice and utility demonstrates the plasticity of 
the tool itself, suggesting its amenability to adaptation for application to a variety of 
fact and policy challenges. 
For all their diversity in application,149 today’s water plans fundamentally 
involve a uniform set of elements, i.e., a quantitative and qualitative assessment of 
available water supplies, a characterization of current and projected future 
demands, an analysis of the adequacy of supplies relative to demands, and an 
exploration and comparative evaluation of strategic options for closing any 
shortfall, as judged against identified policy goals or “performance objectives.”150 
Engineering professor Jay Lund notes that building on this common foundation, 
water planning can be adapted to specific needs or approaches, including traditional 
single-purpose planning, benefit-cost planning, multi-objective planning, and—
most importantly for our purposes—conflict resolution planning.151 
Lund describes conflict resolution planning as uniquely serving “to 
reconcile individuals or groups with conflicting objectives for water management 
to a single plan or plan strategy.”152 He notes these efforts typically occur in a 
quasi-adversarial context in which “parties have alternatives to participating in a 
formal planning process,” and typically emphasize the value of recruitment, such as 
requirements that the participants “communicate, understand, and negotiate.”153 
This approach generally invests “considerable emphasis, effort and time . . . to 
establish broad confidence and communication in both technical and decision-
making processes,”154 again emphasizing the need for recruitment of would-be 
adversaries to a more collaborative forum. Given the fact-intensive nature of the 
planning exercise and the increased prioritization of public engagement, the tool 
may even be superior to traditional adversarial modes for certain purposes. 
As Schlager and Blomquist argue, adversarial and collaborative modes of 
engagement are “‘psychologically incompatible,’” with the former rewarding 
“‘strategic, and even opportunistic, communication and withholding of 
information—and a good deal of distrust against potential misinformation’”—while 
the latter “‘requir[es] creativity, effective communication, and mutual trust.’”155 
Given these distinctions between adversarial and collaborative modes, 
“[i]nformation asymmetries can contribute to creating an atmosphere of distrust 
and deception, discouraging individuals from working together to find outcomes 
superior to what they currently achieve.”156 In the tribal-state water conflict 
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context, political scientist Lloyd Burton similarly observes that the combatants do 
not always appear focused on resolution as much as competitive position: 
[F]or one or more parties in a dispute, settlement may not be a 
primary goal. Indeed, keeping the dispute unsettled, active, off 
balance, and costly to all concerned may in some situations be 
the preferred strategy. Also, in the disputing process each party 
plans and executes strategy to get the dispute into the friendliest 
forum under the most favorable conditions possible at the lowest 
costs to themselves and the greatest cost to their opponents. In 
short, each party tries to manage the dispute (regarding forum, 
transaction costs, movement toward or away from settlement, at 
so on) to its own advantage.157 
Indeed, given the sweeping nature of the issues and history of distrust, relegation of 
tribal and state actors to adversarial forums may compound the typical challenges 
arising from competition. Certainly Schlager’s, Blomquist’s, and Burton’s 
observations echo concerns voiced by the Western Water Policy Review Advisory 
Committee twenty years ago.158 
Conversely, properly structured opportunities for cooperative fact-finding 
and information distribution and analysis outside of or insulated from adversarial 
contexts, i.e., properly structured planning exercises, can facilitate breaking down 
the distrust and gamesmanship inimical to building consensus and collaboration.159 
Admittedly, water planning has no legal force and can provide no enforceable 
finality,160 which can serve as a legitimate basis for criticism.161 Critics have also 
pointed to the general lack of uniform water planning methodologies as well as 
structural challenges to reliable information gathering and implementation.162 
These critiques and observations are valid, but they also serve primarily to 
underscore the fact that water planning remains an evolving tool, which may be 
part of its value—allowing a flexibility to permit locally appropriate exercises in 
joint fact finding, issue spotting, and policy debate.163 Indeed, given the burden and 
pace of achieving enforceable finality through formal legal mechanisms, the 
opportunity for interim or supplemental progress through enhanced 
intergovernmental engagement has manifold attractions. 
And it is not an entirely new idea. In its 1978 National Indian Water 
Policy, the United States Department of the Interior recommended ensuring tribal 
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participation in water resource planning development and making federal technical 
resources available for such purposes.164 While this policy was never fully 
implemented, federal technical resources are available to tribes for purposes of 
water development planning,165 which tribes have used to deepen capacities for 
water resources assessments and to develop and implement supply and restoration 
projects.166 However, the skepticism that tends to affect tribal regard for legal 
processes167 can tend also to adversely impact tribal willingness to engage in 
intergovernmental planning efforts; as tribal planner Sharon Hausam puts it, 
“[a]fter centuries of being excluded, ignored, or misunderstood in decision-making 
processes, it is reasonable to doubt that regional planning might be an 
improvement.”168 Hausam’s comments help to re-ground discussion of engagement 
efforts in the same history that contributes to the complexities affecting tribal-state 
water conflict generally.169 
B. State Water Planning and Tribal Engagement: Experiences in California, 
New Mexico, and Oklahoma 
As water management challenges have continued and compounded, states 
increasingly have turned to water planning to build support for initiatives and to 
better inform management decisions.170 However, the question remains, how well 
have they fared in engaging tribes in state water planning efforts? The next section 
examines the experience in three states that seem so far to have made the most 
effort in this regard: California, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. 
Collectively, these three states have 171 federally recognized American 
Indian tribes within their borders—nearly a third of all federally recognized tribal 
governments throughout the United States.171 Among them, however each differs 
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from the other with respect to tribal populations and land bases. For example, less 
than one percent of California’s land base is formally recognized as tribal land,172 
much of which is isolated or otherwise extensively checker-boarded; while a 
greater percentage of lands within Oklahoma are tribally held,173 those lands, too, 
are largely checker-boarded and non-contiguous. In contrast, nearly eleven percent 
of lands within New Mexico is tribally held,174 much of it in substantially 
contiguous parcels. 
These variations in size and degree of contiguity contribute to 
jurisdictional and land ownership diversities that can pose different challenges to 
water resource management efforts. Each state also varies in its demographics. As 
indicated in Figure 1, the non-Hispanic white population makes up only a large 
plurality in California and New Mexico while such population is the significant 
majority in Oklahoma. Meanwhile, the American Indian population of California is 
only one percent of the state’s total population, less than the national proportion of 
one and one-fifth percent,175 while New Mexico and Oklahoma have American 
Indian populations of approximately nine percent, each. 
 
Fig. 1 - State Population Demographics170F 
 State Total population American Indian only 
Non-Hispanic 
white only 
Hispanic only 
California 37,254,522 1.0% 40.1% 37.6% 
New Mexico 2,059,198 9.4% 40.5% 46.3% 
Oklahoma 3,751,351 8.6% 68.7% 8.9% 
176 
These demographics reflect each states’ varied ethnic, cultural, and legal 
histories, all of which impacts their particular relations with the American Indian 
tribes within their borders. With this as background, the following discussion 
examines each of these state’s individual efforts to engage tribes in their water plan 
efforts. 
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1. California 
The United States’ possession of California began with the signing of the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 at the close of the Mexican-American War.177 
As the ink was drying on that treaty, gold was discovered at Sutter’s Mill, 
“prompting a huge influx of Americans seeking their fortunes” and violent conflict 
between the new migrants, who were backed by the United States military, and the 
indigenous American Indian peoples who resisted displacement.178 Of this period 
of violence and dispossession, California historian Hubert Bancroft said, “[i]t was 
one of the last human hunts of civilization, and the basest and most brutal of them 
all.”179 While the federal government made preliminary efforts to secure treaties 
with the tribes of the region, California’s objection to tribal land assignments and 
reservations scuttled the enterprise.180 Meanwhile, the California government 
enacted and implemented laws to effect the disenfranchisement of tribal peoples 
and expedite the expropriation of tribal resources.181 As a result, tribal populations 
and holdings were decimated, leaving the vast majority of American Indians 
“landless” by the dawn of the Twentieth Century.182 Federal efforts between 1906 
and 1934 made some progress in restoring lands and otherwise supporting tribal 
populations,183 but the explosion of California settlement was disastrous for American 
Indian tribes. Legal scholar Carol Goldberg and sociologist Duane Champagne 
make the point that, following the gold rush era and “[t]hroughout much of the 
Twentieth Century, California Indians have been administratively, culturally, 
economically, and politically disadvantaged, even compared with tribes elsewhere 
in the United States.”184 
During this same period of time, the United States responded to local 
agricultural producers’ call for the development of massive water infrastructure—
resulting in the Central Valley Project, a quintessential Bureau of Reclamation 
project.185 As historian Donald Worster argues, the Central Valley Project was not 
only instrumental in engineering water resources in support of epically scaled 
California agricultural development, it also served to mature the Bureau of 
Reclamation into “the technical master of water in the richest agricultural region on 
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30 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 58 
earth . . . the indispensable partner of western industrial farming.”186 In other 
words, through building some of the West’s most storied water infrastructure, 
California proved to be the incubator of the federal government’s primary western 
water developer. 
Today, California has within its borders 109 federally recognized 
American Indian tribes and several other federally unrecognized tribal 
communities.187 Few of these tribes have significant contiguous land holdings, and  
poverty and limited access to infrastructure continue to pose challenges for the 
health and stability of many tribal communities.188 At the same, some tribes located 
near urban centers have been able to capitalize on gaming,189 which has had 
significant positive local and statewide economic impact.190 Perhaps more 
importantly, success in economic development has provided means for 
strengthening tribal institutions and potentially enhancing the exercise of tribal 
sovereignty in an intergovernmental context.191 
California has a comprehensive water law system, which includes 
provisions for the conduct of stream adjudications,192 and has secured water rights 
settlements with several American Indian tribes, i.e., the La Jolla, Ricon, San 
Pasquale, Pauma, and Pala Bands of Mission Indians,193 the Pechanga Band,194 and 
the Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians.195 Through its Water Resources Control 
Board, the state also develops a comprehensive statewide water plan196 and 
provides financial, technical resources, and facilitation services support to regional 
water planning efforts.197 And in recent years, the state has made significant tribal 
outreach efforts.198 
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Early in the state’s outreach efforts, California water law practitioner 
Curtis Berkey made the case that Indian tribes “acknowledge that California’s 
water planning process may present an opportunity for collaboration in devising 
water management plans that protect tribal resources and foster cooperation 
between Tribes and their neighbors,” but are “too often seen as merely part of the 
general public, rather than sovereign entities with enforceable water rights under 
federal law.”199 He pointed to the Coachella Valley Water District’s local water 
plan, for example, and explained it “contains no evidence that Indian Tribes were 
consulted in its formulation,” notwithstanding the district’s inclusion of four Indian 
reservations comprised of nearly 50,000 acres.200 As he suggested, this omission 
appears conscious, since the plan admitted it made “no distinctions among ‘Indian 
trust assets and other lands within District boundaries.’”201 Berkey contrasted this 
approach with that of the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board, 
which was “making efforts to include Indian Tribes within that region in 
development of a water quality restoration plan for the Klamath River Basin, and 
has held at least one hearing on an Indian reservation affected by the plan.”202 
Berkey’s focus on the Coachella District’s omission may have been prescient; four 
years after he made his case, the district was sued by the Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians, which has successfully asserted reserved rights to the 
groundwaters of the Coachella Valley.203 
Berkey suggested several factors that may contribute to the “near 
invisibility of Indian Tribes in state and regional water planning,”204 including the 
legal and political complexities of the issues, the history of distrust and hostility 
among the parties, and the absence of state statute obligating state agency 
consideration of tribal rights and interests.205 However, California’s efforts in 
recent years indicate it is taking serious steps toward ameliorating some of those 
concerns.206 
For example, in 2009, California formed a Tribal Communications 
Committee “to advise the California Department of Water Resources on how to 
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better contact, and communicate with, the more than 160 Native American Tribes 
in California.”207 In that first effort, twenty-seven Tribal representatives 
participated in the formulation of a written tribal communication plan.208 That same 
year, the first Tribal Water Summit was held under the water plan’s auspices to 
provide a forum for relevant discussion and to facilitate coordination of tribal input. 
(It was in this forum that Berkey presented his paper.)209 The summit produced a 
detailed set of Recommended Actions for Addressing California Native American 
Tribal Water Issues,210 and thereafter, California took a series of responsive actions 
designed to increase government-to-government tribal-state engagement, including: 
 
 the formation of a Tribal Advisory Committee, apparently supported by 
direct outreach to tribal leaders;211 
 the establishment of a California Water Plan’s Tribal Advisory Committee 
and establishment of the group’s charter;212 
 Governor Brown’s issuance of Executive Order B-10-11, which provided 
that “it is the policy of this Administration that every state agency and 
department subject to my executive control shall encourage 
communication and consultation with California Indian Tribes” and 
“permit elected officials and other representatives of tribal governments to 
provide meaningful input into the development of legislation, regulations, 
rules, and policies on matters that may affect tribal communities;”213 and  
 pursuant to the governor’s executive order, the creation of the Governor’s 
Tribal Advisor Office, which reports directly to the state’s chief executive 
with respect to oversight and implementation of “effective government-to-
government consultation between the Governor’s Administration and 
California Tribes on policies that affect California tribal communities.”214 
 
As of 2013, the California Water Plan Tribal Advisory Committee 
included representation from forty state and federally recognized tribes (15%), plus 
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two additional tribal organizations,215 and in April of that year, the second Tribal 
Water Summit was held, organized primarily by tribal representatives.216 The 
Proceedings from these summits suggest a significant level of substantive tribal 
engagement.217 
The 2013 update to the California Water Plan emphasized three 
fundamental policy goals: commitment to integrated water management, 
strengthening of government agency alignment, and investment in innovation and 
infrastructure.218 Notably, the state policy goal of engagement and collaboration 
with tribal governments is woven throughout the plan’s call for strengthening of 
government agency alignment, generally.219 Meanwhile the California Water Plan 
Tribal Advisory Committee is preparing for the 2018 plan update.220 
2. New Mexico 
Like California, the United States’ possession of New Mexico began at the 
end of the Mexican-American War and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.221 While 
the United States’ acquisition and establishment of the New Mexico Territory 
triggered its citizens’ increased migration to the region, it was not nearly the 
stampede occasioned by the California gold rush.222 During this period, the United 
States surveyed and confirmed American Indian tribal land title previously vested 
under Spanish and Mexican law,223 offering basic protection for some tribal 
property interests and some stability in the early development of the region. 
However, the sovereign status of the individual tribal collectives and their relation 
to the federal common law of Indian affairs was not established until statehood,224 
which led to interim confusion regarding certain land transactions.225 Still, such 
tribal status and land bases were confirmed within twenty years of statehood, and 
the federal law’s protection of the rights and powers incident thereto has likewise 
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long been affirmed.226 Today, while challenges remain, the tribes in New Mexico 
have reclaimed their collective position as a significant part of the region’s 
economy, particularly with respect to tribal gaming;227 meanwhile the State of New 
Mexico has evolved over the decades has developed a culturally diverse, fiscally 
conservative, and generally socially tolerant political atmosphere.228 
New Mexico, situated in the high plains desert of the American southwest, 
has a long history of water rights litigation and negotiation. Three of its oldest 
stream adjudications—the Lewis adjudication initiated in the 1956,229 the Aamodt 
adjudication initiated in 1966,230 and the Abeyta adjudication initiated in 1969231—
are generations old and have each produced decrees of tribal water rights; in fact, of 
the twenty-three American Indian tribes with lands in New Mexico,232 eight have 
obtained final and enforceable declarations of their water rights through either 
litigation233 or negotiated settlement.234 As already noted, the unique complexities 
of Pueblo water rights have so far hindered the development of a uniform standard 
for defining those rights,235 but New Mexico has nonetheless established a fairly 
successful, if slow,236 tradition of handling tribal water rights matters within 
traditional adversarial processes. It has also long worked to engage tribal 
governments in regular water planning efforts.237 
New Mexico’s Office of the State Engineer (OSE) and its Interstate 
Stream Commission (Commission) produced New Mexico’s first statewide water 
plan in 2003238 and, since then, have produced updates every five years.239 The 
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state developed the narrative substance of its first plan through extensive public 
input, including twenty-nine public meetings in which approximately 1,500 
individuals participated,240 the plan offered the following declaration: 
The [Commission and OSE] shall consult directly with the 
governments of Indian nations, tribes and pueblos to formulate a 
statement of policy and process to guide: (1) coordination or 
integration of the water plans of Indian nations, tribes and 
pueblos located wholly or partially within New Mexico with the 
state water plan; and (2) final adjudication or settlement of all 
water rights claims by Indian nations, tribes and pueblos located 
wholly or partially within New Mexico.241  
This declaration is now included in New Mexico’s water law statutes.242 
Contemporaneous with this declaration, New Mexico took steps to 
formalize mechanisms for intergovernmental tribal-state engagement and 
collaboration. The first step, in 2003, was Governor Bill Richardson’s uniting of 
leaders from tribes throughout the state to sign a joint Statement of Policy and 
Process to, among other things, “establish and promote a relationship of 
cooperation, coordination, open communication and good will, and work in good 
faith to amicably and fairly resolve issues and differences.”243 Two years later, 
Governor Richardson issued Executive Order 2005-004, relating to the Statewide 
Adoption of Tribal Consultation Plans.244 Finally in 2009, New Mexico enacted its 
State-Tribal Collaboration Act, which directed the establishment of tribal liaison 
positions in each agency of state government, the training of state employees in 
cultural competencies, and the development of state-tribal communication and 
collaboration policies and capacities.245 In short, during this relatively short period 
of time, New Mexico took several specific and concrete actions to develop and 
refine its ability to engage directly and in a government-to-government capacity 
with American Indian tribes located within its borders. 
Meanwhile, in its 2013 Plan Review, the Commission and OSE provided a 
substantive update on the progress of tribal-state engagement, reporting that long-
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standing efforts to achieve negotiated water right settlements with the Navajo 
Nation and the Pueblos of Nambe, Taos, Tesuque, Pojoaque, and San Ildefonso had 
been successful since the 2003 plan’s release.246 The agencies also reported that the 
New Mexico Legislature had recently enacted the Indian Water Rights Settlement 
Fund and appropriated $35 million toward the three tribal water settlements.247 
Finally, though less remarkably, the agencies reported that they had “met with the 
Tribes, Pueblos and Nations in public meetings over the course of the past ten years 
to address water planning goals. All the parties involved have a strong commitment 
to create a mutually agreeable statement of policy and process to guide 
coordination and integration of the water plan.”248 
In addition to its statewide plan, New Mexico conducts regional water 
planning, which provides tribe-specific engagement data.249 The Commission 
generally provides central oversight and guidance, while “self-defined water 
planning regions” perform data collection and water planning strategy 
prioritization.250 The regional process emphasizes the value of public engagement 
but provides that “the extent and nature of public involvement in the regional water 
planning process is the prerogative of each region . . . .”251  
As to tribal engagement, the Commission’s regional planning handbook 
offers: 
Indian tribes and pueblos are a key stakeholder group in New 
Mexico. The [Commission] has a tribal liaison and conducts 
periodic tribal summits on water resource issues. The state and 
the regions will encourage tribal participation in the regional and 
state water plan updates. However, the state respects tribal 
sovereignty and will abide by tribal decisions regarding the 
extent of their participation in the process.252 
Of New Mexico’s sixteen planning regions, seven (44%) included significant tribal 
lands and waters, and a review of the 2016 regional plan updates253 indicates 
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consistent efforts to integrate tribal voices and issues—an effort regional planners 
appear focused on continuing to evaluate and potentially improve.254 
For example, as tabulated in Figure 2, six (86%) of the seven water 
planning regions included representation from tribal governments on their steering 
committees, and the seventh indicated that tribal leaders had been invited but did 
not report participation. Of the twenty-three tribes in New Mexico, ten (43%) 
participated through appointees to regional planning steering committees, with four 
(17%) participating in multiple regions.255 Thirteen (57%) appear not to have 
participated in any regional planning body.256 
 
 
Fig. 2 - New Mexico Planning Regions 
Planning Region No. of Tribes Within Region 
No. of Tribes on 
Steering 
C i
Tribal Participation 
Rate 
Region 2 (San Juan) 3 1 33% 
Region 3 (Jemez y Sangre) 8 3 38% 
Region 6 (Northwest New Mexico) 4 4 100% 
Region 7 (Taos) 2 0 0% 
Region 10 (Lower Pecos) 1 1 100% 
Region 12 (Middle Rio Grande) 12 2 17% 
Region 14 (Rio Chama) 2 2 100% 
 
As to the relationship between participation in water planning and 
traditional adversarial processes, there seems little relationship. For example, seven 
(70%) of the ten tribes that participated in regional water planning are also party to 
ongoing stream adjudications,257 of the five non-participating tribes that are already 
party to ongoing stream adjudications, three (60%) are party to the same case,258 
which may suggest the possibility of a cause specific to that proceeding, and one 
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Tribal%20Participation.pdf. (evaluating and proposing reforms to state’s outreach efforts). 
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Region 6; Mescalero Apache Nation participated in Region 10; and Sandia Pueblo participated in 
Region 12. 
 256. See id. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Ohkay Owingeh, Cochiti Pueblo, Kewa, Nambe Pueblo, San 
Ildefonso Pueblo, Taos Pueblo, Picuris Pueblo, Isleta Pueblo, Jemez Pueblo, San Felipe Pueblo, Santa 
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 257. See id. Acoma Pueblo, Jicarilla Nation, Laguna Pueblo, Mescalero Apache Tribe, Navajo 
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already obtained a decree of rights. 
 258. See id. Jemez Pueblo, Santa Ana Pueblo, and Zia Pueblo, each of whom is a claimant in the 
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(20%) has very limited land holdings in New Mexico,259 with the majority of its 
lands lying within Colorado’s borders, which suggests tribal priorities may lie 
north of the state line. Furthermore, while it may be a safe assumption that 
participation in an active adjudication would dissuade a tribe from engagement in 
collaborative water planning, three (23%) of the non-participating tribes are party 
to completed water right settlements that resolved their water right claims,260 a 
status that should reduce perception and concern of legal risk associated with 
intergovernmental cooperative engagement. Admitting that this is a small sample 
size, these numbers do not suggest any clear correlation between participation in 
regional water planning and participation in active litigation or formal negotiations; 
whether to participate or not in planning efforts seems a decision made without 
necessary regard to prior or contemporaneous participation in litigation or 
negotiation efforts. 
Finally, each of the 2016 regional planning reports include discussions of 
applicable tribal water codes and water quality standards applicable to water use 
within their boundaries—discussing, for example, the Jicarilla Nation’s water code 
as well as its water and wastewater utility codes and water quality standards 
promulgated by seven tribes. 
3. Oklahoma 
The United States acquired the lands that now comprise Oklahoma as part 
of the Louisiana Purchase,261 a portion of which was set aside from the public 
domain for purposes of implementing President Andrew Jackson’s Indian removal 
policies.262 During the pre-statehood period, tens of thousands of American Indians 
were forcibly removed from their aboriginal homelands, effectuating the near 
complete ethnic cleansing of the United States east of the Mississippi as tribes were 
relocated to treaty lands in what was loosely denominated Indian Territory.263 
Those tribes were not long alone in their new homelands, however. 
Following the American Civil War, American expansion came to Indian 
Territory.264 Expedited by post-war enthusiasm for western development and new 
treaties that allowed the railroads access to tribal lands,265 American Indians were 
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soon overwhelmed by non-Indian migrants. Within the first decade of the new 
century, Congress again imposed and coerced the dismantlement of tribal treaty 
homelands to make way for Oklahoma’s entry as the forty-sixth state,266 a process 
that included massive government-sponsored land runs that facilitated an 
overwhelming inflow of non-tribal settlement.267 The establishment of the State of 
Oklahoma seems to have been contemporaneously presumed to have effectuated 
the erasure of the tribal communities and systems on which it was superimposed,268 
and as a result of the policies attendant to that goal, tribal peoples were reduced to a 
remarkable level of poverty and disenfranchisement under new state law systems. 
As Oklahoma historian Angie Debo observed in 1951 with respect to the Five 
Tribes of eastern Oklahoma, “they were protected theoretically by laws and courts, 
which they did not understand and could not use; actually the whole legal system of 
Eastern Oklahoma was warped to strip them of their property”269 as result, “[t]hese 
Indians, who less than fifty years ago owned half of what is now the state of 
Oklahoma, live in appalling poverty.”270 
But the later decades of the Twentieth Century saw a remarkable 
resurgence of tribal governance in Oklahoma.271 Beginning with the American 
Civil Rights movement, grassroots tribal leaders emerged to reorganize efforts to 
take back control of tribal assets and rebuild tribal institutions.272 Among other 
successes, these efforts led to the enactment of the Principal Chiefs Act,273 which 
ended federal law limitations on tribal selection of leaders of Oklahoma tribes, and 
to litigation that culminated in the revitalization of pre-statehood tribal 
constitutionssources of organic tribal national sovereignty that survived 
Oklahoma statehood.274 Today, thirty-eight federally recognized American Indian 
tribes are located within Oklahoma’s borders,275 many of whom have helped 
establish a regionally robust gaming economy, resulting in tribal governments 
serving collectively as a major economic engine in modern Oklahoma, particularly 
its rural areas.276 
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Meanwhile, Oklahoma’s mechanisms for tribal-state relations regarding 
water are uncertain. As a general matter, the state governor, whose staff includes a 
statutorily designated Native American Liaison,277 is authorized “to negotiate and 
enter into cooperative agreements on behalf of the state with federally recognized 
Indian tribes” within the state to address issues of mutual interest.278 While the state 
has secured numerous tribal-state compacts through this and associated 
mechanisms, the governor’s authority is explicitly curtailed with respect to any 
agreement “involving the surface water and/or groundwater resources of this state 
or which in whole or in part apportions surface and/or groundwater ownership.”279 
The state has developed no water compact through this mechanism, and it has 
otherwise had very little experience of water rights litigation, in general; what 
litigation it has had has been locally idiosyncratic280 or otherwise lost in the 
complexities of the state’s unique water law system, giving rise to significant 
uncertainties.281 
Oklahoma enacted its first water planning statute in 1963, which called for 
the development of “statewide and local plans to assure the best and most effective 
use and control of water to meet both the current and long-range needs of the 
people of Oklahoma.”282 Relying on data from state and federal agencies, the 
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (Board) produced the first phase of a statewide 
water plan in 1975,283 which included the following policy declaration: 
The overall objective of the Plan is the maximum utilization of 
the State’s water resources for all citizens. Because State law 
notes that all stream water originating in or flowing through the 
State, within limits of interstate compacts, is the property of the 
State of Oklahoma, tribes must file for water rights. Equal care is 
taken to ensure that these water rights are protected. Stream and 
ground water rights currently held by various tribes were given 
full consideration in the formulation of the plan to ensure this 
protection, and water needs for present and long- range tribal 
development have also been considered.284 
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Again not appearing to provide for public participation, the Board produced its first 
full water plan in 1980, in which it stated the following: 
In regard to Indian water rights, the State of Oklahoma 
recognizes the Winters Doctrine . . . , which doctrine maintains 
that water rights may be attached to Indian reservations created 
by lawful means, i.e., treaties, acts of Congress or executive 
orders. However, it should be noted that no Indian reservations 
presently exist in Oklahoma, with those previously existing being 
substantially dissolved by allotment of lands in severalty during 
the period of time from 1891 through 1906. The future water 
needs of Oklahoma’s substantial Indian population have been 
considered within the water requirement projections included in 
the Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan.285 
Both of these statements manifest a specific view of and attitude toward tribal 
water rightsone which directly discourages tribal participation or invocation of 
federal law rights. 
The Board did not update its water plan again until 1995,286 but this time, 
it significantly engaged public input via two Water Plan Advisory Committees—a 
Citizens Advisory Committee, which brought a “grass-roots perspective to the 
planning table,” and a Technical Advisory Sub-Committee, which “allowed state 
and federal water agencies to contribute their knowledge and experience.”287 There 
is no indication in the 1995 Update of any outreach to American Indian tribes; 
though, outside of these processes, other matters may have affected the state’s 
approach. 
First, after years of litigation,288 the state and several tribes negotiated and 
were now implementing significant tax compacts,289 opting for negotiated 
intergovernmental cooperation rather than conflict. Likewise, the state and several 
tribes entered into gaming compacts pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act,290 producing positive economic impacts that have proven instrumental in 
rebuilding tribal institutions, programs, and services. 
Second, the Chickasaw Nation and Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma asserted 
their water rights during this period to object to a state effort to sell water 
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originating from the tribes’ historic treaty territory to out-of-state water users.291 
Those tribal claims triggered a new era in the handling of tribal water rights in 
Oklahoma, as suggested by the 1995 Plan’s statement:  
Indian water rights in Oklahoma concern both fundamental 
sovereignty and water quantity and quality. Indian claims to 
water rights could have a significant effect on existing state water 
law as well as the current system of water rights administration 
and water quality regulation in Oklahoma.292 
Consistent with this new recognition of the subject matter significance, the 
Board included in the 1995 Update a call for increased outreach, partnership, and 
the identification of specific projects the state and tribes could pursue jointly in an 
effort to “develop a level of trust” and seek resolution of “the Indian water rights 
issue in a non-confrontational manner. . . . “293 The primary efforts toward this end 
were spent on addressing Chickasaw and Choctaw opposition to the state’s plan to 
sell water to Texas water users and coming to terms on a possible compact.294 
However, those efforts failed to produce a compact and, instead, resulted in the state 
legislature’s restricting the Governor’s compacting authority, as already 
described.295 
Prior to the completion of its next 2012 water plan update, three new 
developments further affected tribal-state relations. First, in a natural resources 
damages lawsuit Oklahoma filed against poultry farmers in the upper Illinois River 
watershed, the federal district court issued a July 2009 dismissal of state claims on 
the grounds that the Cherokee Nation, which was not a party to the action and 
could not be joined due to its sovereign immunity, had “a real and substantial 
interest in some as-yet undetermined portion of the waters of the Illinois River.”296 
The court dismissed the state’s damages claims notwithstanding an agreement its 
Attorney General had entered with the Cherokee Nation on the subject,297 nor 
would it later allow the Cherokee Nation to intervene, concluding such motion was 
untimely.298 In short, the unanswered questions relating to tribal water rights in 
Oklahoma resulted in the state’s inability to pursue a high-profile integrated 
resource damages claim.299 
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Next, in May 2010, a state policy group coordinated with the Board to 
hold a multi-day, state-wide public input session on water and water resource 
matters as an adjunct to the state’s water planning efforts. This session produced a 
final report, which included the following consensus policy recommendation: 
State/Tribal Issues. State and tribal issues must be resolved 
through meaningful government-to-government negotiations, 
preservation and building up on history of “good neighbor” 
relations, and implementation of the specific recommendations 
made on this subject in the 1995 state water plan so that the state 
and tribes can work cooperatively and more efficiently to resolve 
water issues. Tribal governments should be involved in the 
development of the 50 Year Water Plan so as to best address 
tribal water issues . . . . 300 
This statement, produced through a consensus-based public input process, marked a 
significant departure from the prior discussed state policy statements concerning 
tribal relations and water. 
Finally, in August 2011, Oklahoma faced its first tribal water litigation 
when the Chickasaw and Choctaw filed suit to stop a proposed trans-basin water 
project affecting their historic treaty territories.301 In this suit, the tribes argued 
Oklahoma was preempted from exercising state law authority over the proposed 
transfer without federal law inquiry into the potential impact such administrative 
action would have on the tribes’ claimed treaty right to a sustainable homeland.302 
The tribes alleged that resort to litigation was necessary because the state has not 
taken seriously their prior efforts to seek cooperative resolution.303  
In response,Oklahoma’s former Attorney General Scott Pruitt, who now 
serves as Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
under President Donald Trump, personally wrote to Oklahoma citizens in several of 
the affected basins to express the state’s position that, one, it was “doubtful” the 
tribes had any water rights whatsoever and, two, responsive litigation, i.e., a state-
filed general stream adjudication, was the only means available “to move forward 
with any confidence that [the state] will not be plagued with claims of Tribal rights 
again and again in the future as either moods or tribal leaders change.”304 Through 
his office, he then represented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court that the tribes’ 
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lawsuit put “the very future of [the] State of Oklahoma” at risk, warning that the 
“State could become an economic dust bowl” if the tribal lawsuit proceeded in 
federal court.305 
In the midst of (and contrast to) this rancor, the Board completed its most 
recent water plan update306 and, in doing so, for the first time included specific 
outreach to tribal governments. This outreach began prior to the litigation through 
the Board’s contracting a member of the University of Oklahoma College of Law 
faculty to serve as liaison with tribal representatives in a series of informal 
consultations.307 These consultations, the tribal participants to which were not 
disclosed, resulted in a report and recommendations that differed starkly from the 
Attorney General’s contemporaneous legal position.308 Specifically, the report and 
the 2012 plan update’s policy recommendations regarding tribal water issues 
emphasized the substantive reality of unaddressed tribal water rights in 
Oklahoma309 and focused on the state’s lack of process for tribal-state engagement, 
calling on it to: 
 
 identify what state government entity has the authority to develop a tribal-
state water rights negotiation process, to conduct such negotiations, and 
approve any product of negotiation once completed; 
 establish an authorized team to work with tribal representatives on the 
development of a negotiation process; 
 engage with tribes, pursuant to such established process, to complete 
binding negotiated resolution of claims; and 
 develop and implement tribal-state consultation protocols.310 
 
Oklahoma has taken no specific legislative or administrative steps based 
on its 2012 Update’s recommendation, though in August 2016, Oklahoma and the 
Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations announced a comprehensive settlement of 
litigation that addressed the proposed trans-basin project and included a framework 
for tribal-state engagement on future water permitting and planning.311 
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C. Observations on the Experiences in California, New Mexico, and 
Oklahoma 
The experiences of California, New Mexico, and Oklahoma show a range 
of approaches and results: California and New Mexico have achieved a significant 
level of tribal engagement, while Oklahoma has not. 
With respect to the historical and relational context, none of these states 
depart markedly from the generalized discussion of Part II.312 One might suggest 
that California and Oklahoma, both of which were founded in contexts that 
involved substantial tribal dispossessions enacted by law and violence, would 
problematize their outreach efforts. Indeed, Berkey intimated as much,313 and the 
apprehension of tribes to participate in Oklahoma’s planning process is 
documented;314 on the other side of the table in Oklahoma, its litigation positions 
continue to adhere to arguments that cast tribal treaty rights as presenting an 
existential threat to the state itself, suggesting a significant hostility regarding tribal 
sovereignty.315 Notwithstanding both states’ having difficult histories, their 
approaches and experiences differ markedly, however— with California’s outreach 
and engagement obtaining positive tribal response after only a few years’ effort, 
while Oklahoma’s fractured approach has failed to engage directly with tribes, 
despite having identified it as a policy priority twenty years ago. 
With respect to legal processes, each state has significant experience 
litigating and negotiating with tribal governments. In California and New Mexico, 
this experience includes engagement over water rights, which has been playing out 
for decades, and has produced numerous tribal water right settlements.316 
Conversely, though it has had substantial experience in the litigation and 
negotiation of compacts with American Indian tribes on other complex 
intergovernmental matters,317 Oklahoma has participated in only one tribal water 
lawsuit and negotiation, which was only recently initiated and completed.318 While 
Oklahoma’s relative lack of experience in water resource litigation and negotiation 
may be relevant, the experience of each state suggests an ability to bridge complex 
differences with tribal sovereigns and to find cooperative approaches on divisive 
issues. 
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Finally, in each of these states, American Indian tribal communities have 
successfully engaged in tribal institution building and economic development 
initiatives in accord with federal self-determination policies,319 which create 
additional opportunities for mutually beneficial intergovernmental alliances.320 
Rather than suggest challenges, this characteristic would suggest a greater 
likelihood of success for tribal-state engagement, if the effort were properly framed 
and supported. 
Turning to the details of each state’s effort, larger distinctions appear. 
Specifically, success appears driven by the substance and institutional foundation 
for outreach efforts. New Mexico’s and California’s outreach, for example, 
specifically included a focus on establishing known mechanics and protocols for 
intergovernmental engagement. Both states established high- level liaisons within 
their respective chief executive’s offices and have launched agency-specific 
implementation strategies and projects across state government. Furthermore, both 
states developed the mechanics and protocols for intergovernmental engagement 
through government- to-government talks with American Indian tribes, building a 
mutual investment in the success of those efforts. 
Additionally, both California and New Mexico have made high-level 
institutional commitments to their efforts. In New Mexico, the state’s efforts are 
founded on both statutory and executive department authorizations, while state 
efforts in California have been founded on explicit executive department actions 
alone. In both instances, implementation has been led by the state’s chief executive, 
and in both states, tribal communities have responded. 
In contrast, Oklahoma lacks a functional mechanism or protocol for 
government-to- government tribal engagement on water issues, and while statute 
authorizes the state governor to negotiate agreements with tribes on matters of 
mutual interest, that same statute expressly ties the governor’s hands with respect 
to water resource agreements. Tribal concerns on this point are well documented in 
the state’s 2012 plan update321 and were otherwise publicly cited as reason for the 
initiation of litigation in 2011.322 
Additionally, while the state’s lead water planning agency has consistently 
acknowledged interest in and the importance of collaborative engagement with 
tribal governments,323 its prior plan’s preemptive denial of the validity of tribal 
water right claims324 appears to continue with some force and influence through the 
positions of other executive department denials of the legitimacy and substance of 
tribal claims to sovereignty, relying on polarizing rhetoric of tribal “otherness” that 
cast tribal treaty rights as a marked existential threat to state government.325 At 
best, the history of Oklahoma’s institutional approach to tribal governments 
regarding water suggests dysfunction, ambivalence, and uncertainty. By any 
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measure, its track record regarding tribal engagement stands in stark contrast to 
California’s and New Mexico’s. 
D. Lessons, Questions, and Concluding Thoughts 
When one examines water conflict, substantial common interests can 
appear. While parties differ on how they would individually approach a given issue, 
for example, they may share common ground in the desire for reliable access to and 
management of water resources, improved community and intergovernmental 
relations, locally appropriate economic development, and effective planning for a 
future of shared success.326 The history of water in the United States (and 
elsewhere) is easily viewed as a history of conflict, and our reliance on adversarial 
processes tends to focus differing parties on disaggregating competition while 
blinding them to potential common ground. 
There are, of course, exceptions—modes of conflict and responses that 
can “serve as an embryo from which cooperation can emerge.”327 The challenge is 
to create the environment in which that opportunity can emerge. Notwithstanding 
their successes so far, it is not clear yet whether California’s or New Mexico’s 
efforts will create those sorts of opportunities, but they mark a start in the right 
direction. 
In their work on heterogeneities in common pool resource disputes, 
Schlager and Blomquist discuss interaction orientations such as individualism, 
competition, altruism, and hostility, and they identify solidarity—the state in which 
a benefit to any member of a group is viewed as success for the members of the 
group—as a necessary “precondition to unrestricted cooperation.”328 Likewise, in 
discussing mechanisms that foster the necessary conditions for cooperation, they 
discuss the value of strategies such as building efforts on common or related sets of 
interests329 or party types.330 
In a fascinating article, geographer Zoltán Grossman brings these concepts 
to life in his exploration of case studies of natural resource conflicts involving 
tribal and non-tribal communities.331 In each of his cases, “members of Native and 
rural white communities unexpectedly came together to protect the same natural 
resources from a perceived outside threat.”332 In each conflict, a tribal group 
asserted a treaty based right to the affected resource that was damaged by the 
subject activity, and triggered “a backlash from some rural whites” and “created a 
conflict around the use of land or natural resources.”333 And in each of his selected 
cases, Grossman shows, as the conflict’s intensity calmed over time, tribal and non- 
tribal factions “initiated dialogue” and “increased collaboration around the 
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protection of their community livelihood and common natural resources.”334 As he 
observes, the combatants ultimately “believed that if they continued to contest the 
place, to fight over resources, there may not be any left to fight over.”335 
Grossman identified key factors that facilitated this shift. Chief among 
them was a shared sense of place or “‘place membership,’ based on local-scale 
multiethnic territorial identity” that served as a replacement for a more narrow 
“state citizenship”; integral to this commonality was the combatants’ ability to 
build “a sense of a common place or a common bond to the landscape.”336 Next, he 
emphasized the importance of developing a “common purpose in legal, political, or 
economic fields” as well as a shared desire to find resolution rather than mere 
partisan victory—or, as he put it, “a sense of a common understanding.”337 
Fundamentally, Grossman documents efforts within diverse communities to build 
upon a shared interest in a common, if not collective, enjoyment of place and 
appurtenant resources and, thus, to shift from distributive competition to integrative 
cooperation. 
While conflict is our tradition with respect to management of water 
resources and while the potential for conflict inheres to the tribal-state relationship, 
conflict is not the only path we can take in our search for progress. The options our 
formal dispute resolution mechanisms present are limited, i.e., litigation or formal 
negotiation, and our nearly exclusive reliance on these tools has so far produced 
only modest progress. However, options for seeking collaborative engagement, 
conflict avoidance, and mutual problem solving appear far more extensive, and as 
water planning methodologies grow more sophisticated, opportunities for greater 
progress through constructive, non-adversarial engagement may open. 
Given the challenges we face in reconciling America’s colonial past with 
its constitutional present, it seems significant that private and public good, both 
tribal and non-tribal, would be well served by our continuing to “be even more 
creative”338 in our exploration of all potential paths. Our failure to do so may result 
in, as Grossman observes, our contest over place and may leave us with no place to 
fight over.339 
IV. CONCLUSION 
More than 100 years have passed since the Supreme Court announced its 
framework for tribal reserved rights to water,340 and nearly forty years have passed 
since finalization of the first negotiated settlement of tribal water rights. In that 
time, tribes, states, and the federal government have wrestled with how to do 
justice to tribal claims within the complex physical, legal, and political realities of 
water use and needs. We have made progress, though not enough, and if we want to 
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make further progress, to borrow the words of the Wester Water Policy Review 
Advisory Committee, we “will have to be even more creative.”341 
Stepping aside from our adversarial processes, water planning appears to 
be a tool well-suited for the further pursuit of collaborative engagement and 
problem solving, and the experiences in California and New Mexico show that 
integrated and well supported state engagement efforts within a government-to-
government framework can be successful in promoting tribal-state water planning 
efforts. Planning cannot substitute for the law’s ability to provide enforceable 
finality, but—creatively structured and skillfully used—it may provide a means for 
enhanced intergovernmental engagement that could lead to more efficient dispute 
resolution in the future. It could, perhaps, even facilitate sustainable and just 
conflict avoidance. 
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